An Incentive-Based Approach to Regulating Workplace Chemicals by Bent, Jason R.
An Incentive-Based Approach to Regulating
Workplace Chemicals
JASON R. BENT*
The United States' system for regulating employee exposures to hazardous
chemicals is broken. Absent regulation, the labor market fails to produce
efficient levels of precaution against chemical exposures. Information
asymmetries, long disease latency periods, and other characteristics of
chemical exposures thwart the market's ability to produce efficient risk/wage
tradeoffs. These same characteristics permit employers and chemical
manufacturers to externalize the costs of illnesses caused by chemical
exposures. The current U.S. regulatory system, including a combination of
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations and state
workers' compensation programs, is not correcting the labor market's failure.
The result is a level of workplace chemical exposure risk that is systematically
too high, and a level ofprecaution that is systematically too low.
The reforms proposed in the literature to date do not harness the financial
incentives of the least-cost information providers and least-cost risk avoiders:
chemical manufacturers and employers. This Article takes the search for a
solution in a new direction by using state workers' compensation laws to
capitalize on the incentives of chemical manufacturers and employers. The
Article argues that state workers' compensation laws should be amended in
two ways: (1) shifi the default burden of proof on causation to the respondents,
but only in cases where there is no applicable OSHA exposure limit, and (2)
allow employers to include chemical manufacturers as respondents in workers'
compensation proceedings for purposes of apportioning liability. These
amendments could be implemented by convening a new National Commission
on State Workers' Compensation Laws. The result would be a new push for
OSHA chemical exposure limits by chemical manufacturers and employers-
the entities in the best position to provide the toxicity and precaution
information necessary to support OSHA regulations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States' system for regulating employee exposures to hazardous
chemicals in the workplace is broken. Approximately 80,000 different
chemicals are used in industrial commerce today, with nearly 1,000 new
chemicals added to the market every year.1 Yet, even the most basic toxicity
information is available for only a tiny fraction of those chemicals.2 Only about
500 chemicals are regulated by an Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) exposure limit. 3 The rest are essentially unregulated as
to employee exposures. The dearth of toxicity information and exposure
regulation, combined with long disease latency periods, allow employers and
chemical manufacturers to externalize much of the expected cost of
occupational chemical exposures. The result is a level of employee exposure
risk that is systematically too high and a level of precaution that is
systematically too low. 4 This Article advances a proposal to correct the market
and regulatory failures by capitalizing on the fundamental financial incentives
of employers and chemical manufacturers.
The workplace safety regime in the United States consists of three
complementary components: (1) the labor market and its capacity to set
compensating wage differentials for risky work before any injury has occurred
ISee Albert C. Lin, Deciphering the Chemical Soup: Using Public Nuisance to
Compel Chemical Testing, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 955, 959 60 n.12 (2010) (citing U.S.
GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATION 1-2 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05458.pdf (stating there are over 82,000 chemicals listed in
EPA's Toxic Substances Control Act inventory)).
2 See id.
3 Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory
Metrics, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1779 (2008); see also Is 01SA Working for Working
People?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Workplace Safety of the S.
Comm. on Health, Education, and Pensions, 110th Cong. 9 (2007) (statement of David
Michaels, Ph.D., Research Director and Associate Chairman of the Department of
Environmental and Occupational Health, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.)
[hereinafter Is OSHA Working?], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 10
shrg35165/pdf/CHRG- 11 Oshrg3 5165.pdf.
4 See W. Kip Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim
Compensation and Risk Regulation, 2 YALE J. ON REG. 53, 57-60 (1984). "These
externalities lead workers and employers to undervalue the true social cost of occupational
disease and thus to put too little emphasis on risk reduction and disease insurance." Id. at 60.
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(ex ante compensation); (2) the workers' compensation system, which replaces
tort suits against employers and provides limited compensation to workers after
they are actually injured in the course of the work (ex post compensation); and
(3) command and control health and safety regulations, including chemical and
substance exposure regulatory limits set by OSHA and enforced through
regulatory monitoring and penalties.
This three-pronged workplace safety regime has two primary goals: first, to
prevent unreasonable (inefficient) risks of worker injuries or illnesses; second,
to provide adequate compensation to those workers who suffer an injury or
illness from working.5 In theory, the three separate components of this
workplace safety regime should work together to lead employers to take an
optimal level of precaution-avoiding unreasonable risks-and also to
adequately compensate injured employees. 6
In an efficient labor market, the first component of the regime would allow
workers inclined to accept riskier jobs to demand risk premiums and thereby
obtain their preferred blend of wages and risk.7 The second component would
impose ex post costs on risky employers through workers' compensation
awards (or, for insured employers, increased workers' compensation insurance
premiums). Employers would then, in theory, take precautions to avoid or
reduce risk to the point at which the marginal cost of doing so exactly equals the
marginal benefit to the employer in avoiding any additional wage premium and
workers' compensation costs it would incur from additional risk-taking. 8 In
addition to setting efficient levels of risk and precaution, the combined effects
of the first two components should theoretically operate to accurately
compensate workers for their expected costs of injury from a particular job,
thereby satisfying the second goal. The third component of the regime is pure
regulatory intervention. OSHA uses its authority to establish certain minimum
standards for workplace safety and punishes employers who violate those
standards. 9
How well these three components work together to prevent unreasonable
risks of workplace accidents is open to debate. Looking only at the statistics for
5 See id. at 56-57.
6 See id.
7 See id
81d. at 56.
9 Thomas 0. McGarity, Reforming OSHfA: Some Thoughts for the Current Legislative
Agenda, 31 Hous. L. REV. 99, 101 (1994). Economists often criticize the regulatory third
component as unnecessary and inefficient, because it may prevent potential gains from trade
where employees with preferences for risk might be willing to take on a level of risk above
that set by the command and control regulations, in exchange for a sufficient wage premium,
and the employer would likewise prefer to pay the wage premium plus any ex post costs
from workers' compensation rather than implement expensive precautions mandated by the
OSHA regulation. See, e.g., Thomas A. Lambert, Avoiding Regulatory Mismatch in the
Workplace: An Informational Approach to Workplace Safety Regulation, 82 NEB. L. REV.
1006, 1010 (2004) (advocating a more limited regulatory scheme, which would generally
replace command and control OSHA regulations with information disclosure regulations).
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on-the-job injuries and accidental fatalities in the workplace, it would appear
that American workplaces are, in the aggregate, getting safer.10 But for
workplace diseases, the regime is failing. The Department of Labor's Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) tracks the number of work-related illnesses reported by
employers to OSHA, and those numbers reflect a decline in recent years. 11
However, disease latency and persistent causation questions undermine the
accuracy of the BLS statistics for occupational diseases. 12 Illnesses caused by
chronic exposure often do not manifest themselves until several years after
exposure, sometimes long after employees have separated from the employer. 13
This prevents accurate reporting to the BLS. 14 Unlike on-the-job physical
injuries, "[m]ost occupational illnesses that are caused" by toxic exposures are
not captured by any tracking system. 15
The problem is exacerbated by a persistent toxicity data gap for industrial
chemicals. 16 This toxicity data gap has been well-recognized by scholars in the
environmental and employment law literature, and it impedes the ability to trace
any particular disease to an identifiable workplace exposure to a given
chemical. 17 Current U.S. environmental and worker safety laws tend to
'ORate of Fatal Work Injuries per 100,000 Workers, 1992 2005, U.S. BUREAU OF
LABOR STAT., http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfoi2005 02.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2012)
(reflecting decline in workplace fatalities from 5.2 per 100,000 full-time-equivalent workers
in 1992 to 4.0 in 2005).
"1 Id.
12 Viscusi, supra note 4, at 54.
13 Id.
141d.; RAY MARSHALL, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AN INTERIM REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE 12 (1980), available at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/fcs96d00/
pdf;jsessionid-56130CD88FF09D730A355FF2EOA88709.tobacco03 ("Finally, all known
industrial carcinogens are associated with long-latency periods which obscure the
association between workplace and disease.").
151s OSHA Working?, supra note 3, at 7 (statement of David Michaels, Ph.D., Research
Director and Associate Chairman of the Department of Environmental and Occupational
Health, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.) ("Most occupational illnesses
that are caused by toxic exposures are never recorded as work-related, either because they
occurred after the worker left the employment where the exposure occurred or because the
link with occupational exposure was never made.").
16 John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and Demand for
Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1365, 1381 (2008) ("As this chart summarizing the
Toxicity Testing results shows, there is a consistent data gap across all categories of
industrial chemicals, regardless of production volume.").
17 See, e.g., id. at 1380-81; Lin, supra note 1, at 961-62; Wendy Wagner, Using
Competition-Based Regulation to Bridge the Toxics Data Gap, 83 IND. L.J. 629, 635 36
(2008); Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1631-33
(2004). Chemical manufacturers acknowledge the existence of this information gap. Lin,
supra note 1, at 959-60 ("[E]ven the chemical industry has acknowledged the wide
information gap. Hundreds of new chemicals enter the flow of commerce each year,
exacerbating the situation." (footnote omitted)).
2012] 1393
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
perpetuate this data gap.' 8 This makes identifying causal connections between
workplace exposures and later-developing diseases difficult. Hence, the BLS
statistics fail to account for a significant portion of diseases caused by
workplace exposures. 19 One study estimated that BLS data fails to include 66 to
75% of occupational diseases.20 The toxicity data gap also undermines the
compensatory goal of the worker safety regime. A 2004 study estimated that
over 98% of deaths caused by occupational disease go uncompensated by the
workers' compensation system.2 1
The puzzle, then, is how to correct the market and regulatory failures that
have hamstrung the three-pronged workplace safety regime's ability to handle
worker disease. This Article solves the puzzle by changing state workers'
compensation laws in two ways: (1) imposing a default burden allocation rule
favorable to claimants on the question of causation in state workers'
compensation proceedings where there is no applicable OSHA exposure limit in
place; and (2) expanding current state workers' compensation laws to
encompass the manufacturers of chemicals used in the workplace as potential
respondents in workers' compensation proceedings.
This proposal is a unique effort to capitalize on the financial incentives of
employers and chemical manufacturers-the entities in the best position to
produce toxicity information and avoid the expected costs of employee
exposures. Because it identifies and corrects the sources of market and
regulatory failure, this proposal presents a promising path for reforming the
workplace safety regime.
Part II of this Article introduces the status quo occupational exposure
regulatory regime through the story of worker exposures to the unregulated
chemical diacetyl, including the questionable responses of chemical
manufacturers and employers to public pressure and legal claims based on
diacetyl exposures. Part III identifies the labor market failure that prevents
efficient allocation of risk, precaution, and wages in the context of workplace
chemical exposures. Understanding the sources of this market failure is a
necessary precedent to meaningful discussion and evaluation of regulatory
reform. Part IV explains the regulatory failures-why and how the current
workers' compensation and OSHA systems are inadequate to correct the market
18 See Lin, supra note 1, at 961 62 ("The toxic ignorance problem is the unsurprising
result of rational decisions by chemical manufacturers not to conduct extensive testing. Our
legal system generally assumes that chemicals are 'innocent until proven guilty'; we restrict
chemical manufacture and distribution only if and when harm is demonstrated." (footnotes
omitted)); Wagner, Commons Ignorance, supra note 17, at 1677 78.
19See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 54.
20 Kenneth D. Rosenman et al., Hiow Much Work-Related Injury and Illness Is Missed
by the Current National Surveillance System?, 48 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. MED. 357,
362 (2006).
21 j. Paul Leigh & John A. Robbins, Occupational Disease and Workers'
Compensation: Coverage, Costs, and Consequences, 82 MILBANK Q. 689, 703-04 (2004)
(finding that workers' compensation programs failed to compensate approximately 98.9% of
the deaths due to occupational disease).
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failures identified in Part III. Part V then briefly considers and evaluates some
of the leading proposals for reform that have been offered by other employment
and environmental scholars. Part V demonstrates that none of these proposals
adequately utilize the financial incentives of employers and chemical
manufacturers, and therefore each proposal would ultimately fall short of
correcting the market and regulatory failures at the root of the problem. Part VI
sets out in detail the proposed solution: a two-part, incentive-based approach
that will spur the production of toxicity information by chemical manufacturers,
leading to more effective regulation of workplace exposures. Part VI also
details the logistics for implementing the proposal by convening a new National
Commission on State Workers' Compensation Laws.
II. THE DIACETYL STORY
A. The Discovery of "Popcorn Lung"
The chemical diacetyl (2,3 butanedione, CAS # 431-03-8) is an organic
chemical that occurs naturally in certain dairy products." 22 Diacetyl can be
produced by extracting it from dairy products or by manufacturing it using
chemical synthesis. 23 Diacetyl has long been used as an additive to food
flavorings to give foods a dairy, butter, or cheese flavor.24 In 1983, diacetyl was
categorized as "generally recognized as safe" by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).25 Diacetyl is best known for its role as the primary
component in artificial butter flavorings used in microwave popcorn. 26
By 1993, at least one manufacturer of diacetyl had some scientific evidence
suggesting that diacetyl could have harmful health effects at sufficiently high
acute exposure levels.2 7 In 1993, the diacetyl manufacturer BASF conducted a
study in which rats were exposed to acute inhalation of pure diacetyl vapor for
22Occupational Exposure to Diacetyl and Food Flavorings Containing Diacetyl, 74
Fed. Reg. 3938, 3939 (proposed Jan. 21, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910)
[hereinafter Proposed Rule for Diacetyl].
2 31d
24 See id; see also OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., WORKER ALERT:
DIACETYL AND SUBSTITUTES (2010) [hereinafter OSHA DIACETYL WORKER ALERT],
available at http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/flavoringlung/diacetyl worker alert.pdf.
2521 C.F.R. § 184.1278 (1983); see also Andrew Scott Dulberg, The Popcorn Lung
Case Study: A Recipe for Regulation?, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 87, 92 (2009).
26 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, OSHA Leaves Worker Safety Largely in Hands of
Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/
25/washington/25osha.html?pagewanted-all; Proposed Rule for Diacetyl, supra note 22.
2 7 See BASF, REPORT: STUDY ON THE ACUTE INHALATION TOXICITY LC50 OF
DIACETYL FCC AS VAPOR IN RATS 4-HOUR EXPOSURE; PROJECT No. 1310247/9270101
(1993), cited in Letter from Nicholas A. Ashford et al., to Elaine L. Chao, Sec'y of Labor,
U.S. Dep't of Labor, at 10 n.20 (July 26, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Letter], available at
http://www.defendingscience.org/sites/default/files/upload/Scientists /20Letter /20to %200
SHA%20on%20Diacety107262006.pdf.
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one four-hour period. The study found that this exposure led to an "abundance
of symptoms indicative for respiratory tract injury." 2 8 The results of this study
were not reported to the government or published in any scientific journals.
BASF did not share the results of this study until 2001.29 Even before the BASF
study, perhaps as early the mid-1970s, some suspected that exposures to
diacetyl caused illnesses.30
In 1999, a physician in Missouri diagnosed a worker in a microwave
popcorn plant with a condition known as bronchiolitis obliterans (sometimes
referred to as "popcorn lung"), a rare and debilitating lung disease that is
sometimes fatal.3 1 Missouri health officials contacted the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), which began to investigate the
plant.32 Missouri officials also requested that OSHA inspect the plant.33 OSHA
inspected the plant but did not take air sample tests; OSHA quickly declared the
facility compliant and closed the file.34 After an OSHA complaint was filed by
a Missouri law firm, OSHA again visited the plant but concluded that further
investigation was not warranted. 35 Instead, OSHA entered into a voluntary
partnership agreement in 2002 with a group of popcorn manufacturers. 36 The
purpose was to gather information and, with the assistance of industry, develop
a "Hazard Information Bulletin" that would permit the dissemination of
information about diacetyl risks to employers and employees.3 7 The agreement
terminated in 2003 without the issuance of a hazard bulletin.38
In contrast to OSHA's response, NIOSH conducted research at the Missouri
microwave popcorn plant and discovered that the workers appeared to have
higher incidences of certain lung ailments than expected in the general
28 2006 Letter, supra note 27, at 2.
2 9 See Dulberg, supra note 25, at 94; 2006 Letter, supra note 27, at 2.
30 Jesse McKinley, Flavoring-Factory Illnesses Raise Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
2007, at 33, cited in Dulberg, supra note 25, at 92.
31 Dulberg, supra note 25, at 87 89.
32 2006 Letter, supra note 27, at 1. NIOSH was created by the OSH Act and is part of
the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the Department of Health
and Human Services. See 29 U.S.C. § 671 (2006). NIOSH is the research counterpart to
OSHA, and is authorized:
(1) to conduct such research and experimental programs as [it] determines are necessary
for the development of criteria for new and improved occupational safety and health
standards, and (2) after consideration of the results of such research and experimental
programs make recommendations concerning new or improved occupational safety and
health standards.
29 U.S.C. § 671(d) (2006).
33 Dulberg, supra note 25, at 96 ("In a letter dated May 19, 2000, MDOH requested that
OSHA visit Jasper and inspect the Gilster-Mary Lee factory ....
3 4 1d
3 51d at 97.
3 6 1d at 98.
3 7 1d.
3 8 1d
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population. 39 The results of the NIOSH investigation were published in the
Center for Disease Control's (CDC) Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report40
and in the New England Journal of Medicine.4 1
In 2006, the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union and
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters petitioned OSHA to adopt an
Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSH Act) regulating occupational exposures to diacetyl. 42 A group
of forty-two doctors, scientists, and public health experts submitted a letter to
the U.S. Secretary of Labor supporting the unions' petition. 43 One year later,
OSHA responded by declining to adopt an ETS. 44 Edwin G. Foulke Jr., the
former Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health,
explained in an interview that "the science is murky" on whether diacetyl
causes bronchiolitis obliterans. 45
By late 2007, some members of Congress were urging a comprehensive
reexamination of diacetyl's effects, in part because of extensive media coverage
and new concerns that diacetyl might even cause health problems through
consumption of microwave popcorn. 46 Under pressure from Congress, OSHA
declared that it would commence a rulemaking process for diacetyl. 47 It also
issued a Safety and Health Information Bulletin and provided a Hazard
Communication Guidance document for employers-some four years after the
voluntary partnership agreement failed to produce a Hazard Information
Bulletin. 48 In October 2007, OSHA held a stakeholder meeting to discuss
occupational exposures to diacetyl and food flavorings containing diacetyl. In
3 9 Dulberg, supra note 25, at 96.
4 0 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, Fixed Obstructive Lung Disease in a
Microwave Popcorn Factory Missouri, 2000 2002, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.
REP., Apr. 26, 2002, at 345-47.
41 Kathleen Kreiss et al., Clinical Bronchiolitis Obliterans in Workers at a Microwave-
Popcorn Plant, 347 NEw ENG. J. MED. 330, 330 38 (2002).42 Dulberg, supra note 25, at 108.
43 See 2006 Letter, supra note 27, at 4-8.
44 Letter from Edwin G. Foulke, Jr., Assistant Sec'y for Occupational Safety & Health,
to James Hoffa, Gen. President, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Sept. 25, 2007), cited in Dulberg,
supra note 25, at 108 n. 189.4 5 Labaton, supra note 26, at A1; see also Dulberg, supra note 25, at 99.46 See Dulberg, supra note 25, at 112 15. Dulberg considers the manufacturers'
response to media pressure a victory, and suggests that the media can play an important role
in combating workplace exposures. Id. However, Dulberg's work predates the revelation that
the diacetyl substitutes may prove just as harmful if not more harmful than diacetyl
itself. Dulberg may have been overly optimistic about the ability of media coverage to
provide an adequate check on industry's economic incentives.
47 Katherine Torres, OSHA Begins Rulemaking Process on Diacetyl, EHS TODAY (Sept.
25, 2007), http://ehstoday.com/standards/osha/ehs imp 72017.
4 8 See generally Hazard Communication Guidance for Diacetyl and Food Flavorings
Containing Diacetyl, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., http://www.osha.gov/dsg/
guidance/diacetyl-guidance.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2012) [hereinafter OSHA Diacetyl
Hazard Communication].
2012] 1397
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
January 2009, OSHA finally issued an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that sought data, information, and comment on "issues related to
occupational exposure to diacetyl and food flavorings containing diacetyl." 49 To
date, there is no OSHA permissible exposure limit (PEL) standard specifically
governing diacetyl or butter flavorings. 50
OSHA's slow response to the diacetyl issue has been criticized by legal
scholars. 51 Professor Susan Bisom-Rapp argues that OSHA "abandon[ed] its
mission" on the diacetyl issue by employing an ineffective strategy that sought
to negotiate and coordinate with manufacturers to arrive at voluntary
compliance. 52
Injured workers from the plant sought compensation for the damages
caused by the exposures by filing workers' compensation claims against their
employer pursuant to the applicable state workplace disease law. 53 As
employers often do in workplace disease claims, the employer initially denied
the claims and denied liability, contending that the workers' diseases were not
caused by workplace exposures to diacetyl. 54 Some workers turned to tort
claims against the manufacturers of diacetyl to seek redress for their injuries. 55
An early successful jury verdict led to a series of settlements between workers
and diacetyl manufacturers.5 6 But the tort system comes with its own efficiency
and distributive concerns, as discussed infra Part IV.B, and is not likely the
optimal way to address workplace safety and health issues.5 7
The scientific evidence suggesting that inhalation exposure to diacetyl can
cause lung damage continues to mount. 58 Yet, as of this writing, there are not
4 9 Proposed Rule for Diacetyl, supra note 22, at 3938. The Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking sought information to "assist the Agency in developing a proposed standard
addressing occupational exposure to diacetyl and food flavorings containing diacetyl." Id.
The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking was later withdrawn so that OSHA could
convene a Small Business Advocacy Review Panel, in compliance with the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801 808 (2006). See 74 Fed. Reg. 11,329
(Mar. 17, 2009).
50 See Flavorings-Related Lung Disease, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN.,
http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/flavoringlung/index.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2012).
5 1 See generally Dulberg, supra note 25. See also DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT Is THEIR
PRODUCT 110 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (citing the popcorn lung story as evidence that
OSHA "has pretty much stopped working"); Susan Bisom-Rapp, What We Learn in
Troubled Times: Deregulation and Safe Work in the New Economy, 55 WAYNE L. REV.
1197, 1208 09 (2009).52 Bisom-Rapp, supra note 51, at 1238.
5 3 Dulberg, supra note 25, at 100 n.108.
54 See id.
5 51d. at 99 100.
5 6 See id. at 100-03.
5 7 See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 62.5 8 OSHA Diacetyl Hazard Communication, supra note 48 ("Recent studies have shown
respiratory tract damage and death among rodents exposed to diacetyl and butter flavorings
containing diacetyl. Hubbs and co-investigators demonstrated in a preliminary study that
exposure of rats to 198.4 ppm of diacetyl for 6 hours caused necrosis of the nasal and
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any permanent, interim, or emergency temporary OSHA standards governing
permissible exposure limits or minimum safety precautions for workers
potentially exposed to diacetyl. Following the media pressure and concerns
about consumer exposures, several major microwave popcorn manufacturers
began to replace diacetyl with substitutes in late 2007. Manufacturers began to
market their microwave popcorn as "Diacetyl-Free." 59
There is new concern, however, that the diacetyl substitutes may be just as
harmful as diacetyl, and that some of them are "actually just another form of
diacetyl." 60 In a December 2009 letter, NIOSH indicated that several different
potential substitutes for diacetyl, including "starter distillate," acetoin, and 2,3-
pentanedione, may cause similar adverse health effects because they contain
high concentrations of diacetyl itself, have similar structures to diacetyl, or have
been inadequately tested.6 1 The Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for 2,3-
pentanedione illustrates the point, reading: "Toxicological Information: To the
best of our knowledge, the chemical/physical/toxicological properties have not
been thoroughly investigated. '62
The NIOSH letter discusses ongoing animal studies of 2,3-pentanedione
suggesting that the diacetyl substitute causes airway damage similar to
diacetyl-perhaps even worse. 63 The NIOSH letter concludes: "The issues
above for starter distallate, acetoin, and 2,3-pentanedione exemplify the lack of
evidence demonstrating the workplace safety of potential substitutes for
diacetyl; and document some evidence that potential substitutes are also
respiratory hazards." 6 4
tracheal epithelium (Hubbs, et al., 2004). In another preliminary study, exposure of mice to
200 and 400 ppm diacetyl via inhalation for 6 hours per day over 5 days caused death, acute
necrotizing rhinitis, and erosive or necrotizing laryngitis (Morgan, 2006).").
59Andrew Schneider, Just When You Thought It Was Safe to Make Popcorn,
AOLNEwS (Dec. 10, 2009), www.aolnews.com/2009/12/10/just-when-you-thought-it-was-
safe-to-make-popcorn.
60 Id.; see also OSHA DIACETYL WORKER ALERT, supra note 24 ("Diacetyl substitutes
that have not been proven to be safe include diacetyl trimer, 2,3 hexanedione, 2,3
heptanedione, and 2,3 pentanedione.").
61 Letter from John Howard, Dir. of NIOSH, to David Michaels, Assistant Sec'y of
Labor for Occupational Health (Dec. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Howard Letter], available
at http://defendingscience.org/sites/default/files/upload/Howard-Letter on Diacetyl_
Substitutes.pdf.
6 2 LANSDOWNE AROMATICS, SAFETY DATA SHEET: 2,3-PENTANEDIONE 2 (2009),
available at http://www.lansdownearomatics.com/assets/Naturals-pdf/2,3-PENTANEDI
ONE.pdf. MSDS's are provided by employers to workers pursuant to OSHA's Hazard
Communication Standard. See infra Part IV.D.
63 Howard Letter, supra note 61.
64Id. In fact, exposures to 2,3 pentanedione may actually be worse for employees'
health than exposures to diacetyl. According to one toxicologist in NIOSH's Health Effects
Laboratory Division, "Pentanedione is a little less water-soluble, so it might be better able to
reach the deep lung." Anietra Hamper, Butter-Flavor Substitutes Also Raise Alarms,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 12, 2010, at A6.
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Meanwhile, microwave popcorn is currently being manufactured using
diacetyl substitutes and marketed to the public as "Diacetyl Free" or as
containing "No Added Diacetyl." 65 The exact chemical mixtures used in place
of diacetyl cannot be known with certainty because the popcorn manufacturers
assert that their recipes are protected trade secrets. 66 It is likely, however, that
manufacturers are using the known substitutes that NIOSH expressed concern
about, including 2,3 pentanedione. NIOSH does not know for certain, and
neither do the employees currently working in microwave popcorn plants. In
fact, many employers do not even know the chemical ingredients of the diacetyl
substitutes they are using in the food manufacturing process. 67
B. Diacetyl and Recurring Themes in Chemical Exposure Cases
1. Innocent Until Proven Guilty
The diacetyl story is not yet concluded, but it follows a familiar plot line for
chemical exposure cases. Under our environmental and worker safety
regulations, chemicals are generally presumed to be safe unless and until proven
otherwise. At the beginning of the story, toxicity studies or other information
suggesting potential harmful effects may be in the hands of chemical
manufacturers, but it is not turned over to the government or disclosed to
employees. 68 The scientific understanding of the effects of exposure to a
particular chemical or substance eventually evolves-usually due to clusters of
observed human illnesses-but it often comes too late to prevent a significant
65 See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also Press Release, ConAgra Foods,
ConAgra Foods Introduces Orville Redenbacher's® and ACT I® Microwave Popcorn with
a New Great Tasting Butter Flavoring with No Added Diacetyl (Dec. 17, 2007), available at
http://media.conagrafoods.com/phoenix.zhtml?c-202310&p-irol-newsArticle&ID-1087864
&highlight-.
66 Schneider, supra note 59 ("Those companies, citing competition, repeatedly refuse to
discuss what they're using today to add the butter flavor to what they sell."); see also
Hamper, supra note 64, at A7 ("At the [NIOSH] lab in West Virginia, researchers say they
don't have a good handle on all of the diacetyl substitutes now in use because of the
reluctance of some food producers to reveal trade secrets.").
67 Hamper, supra note 64, at A7 ("Dr. Kay Kreiss, who investigates health-hazard
complaints for the institute, said that in many instances, food manufacturers themselves
don't know what diacetyl substitutes are in the flavorings they buy."); see also Diacetyl and
Food Flavorings Containing Diacetyl: Stakeholder Meeting, Summary Report,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. (Nov. 27, 2007), www.osha.gov/dsg/guidance
/101707-diacetyl-meeting-notes.html ("A few stakeholders noted that material safety data
sheets (MSDSs) frequently do not include detailed information on flavorings because the
flavoring constituents are proprietary. Some smaller food manufacturers, therefore, might
not be aware of exposures concerns.").
6 8 See THOMAS 0. McGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: How SPECIAL
INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 97, 103 (2008).
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number of serious and debilitating illnesses. 69 Initially, employers may deny
causation and dispute workers' compensation claims. 70 Some workers who are
denied compensation through the workers' compensation system will seek other
avenues of recovery, including tort claims against chemical manufacturers or
other third parties, where possible.7 1
Command and control regulations from OSHA come slowly, if at all,
because of the dearth of information on toxicity and available precautions. 72 If
enough information finally begins to mount implicating the chemical, then
chemical manufacturers and employers will scramble to find substitutes. These
chemical substitutes often present their own unquantified health risks.73
Toxicity information on substitutes may be underdeveloped, and manufacturers
often assert trade secret protection over new chemicals and mixtures. 74 This
cycle may repeat for the substitutes, leading to the introduction of even more
chemical substitutes.
Our three-pronged worker safety regime struggles to regulate the uncertain
risks caused by exposures and generally fails to compensate employees that
may have been harmed by prior exposures. The microwave popcorn workers
likely did not receive a compensating wage differential ex ante because the
science on diacetyl exposures had not yet been developed at the time the
workers negotiated their wages. As for ex post compensation, the employers (at
least initially) denied workers' compensation claims on the grounds of
causation. 75 Some employees were able to recover ex post compensation from
tort claims against the chemical manufacturers, but this outcome is rare, as
explained further below. 76
Aspects of the diacetyl storyline closely parallel our prior experiences with
other workplace exposures to hazardous substances and materials. Probably the
most famous example is asbestos fiber, originally thought to be a relatively safe
6 9 See Lin, supra note 1, at 957 ("Experiences in which we have discovered the hazards
of chemical substances belatedly-ranging from asbestos to benzene to polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) illustrate the potentially broad and serious consequences of toxic
ignorance.").70 MICHAELS, supra note 51, at 227 28.
71 Id. at 223; Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers'
Compensation "Reform," 50 RUTGERS L. REv. 657, 903 (1998).72 MICHAELS, supra note 51, at 223; Is OSHA Working?, supra note 3, at 8-11, 13
(statement of David Michaels, Ph.D., Research Director and Associate Chairman of the
Department of Environmental and Occupational Health, George Washington University,
Washington, D.C.).
7 3 See infra Part 1l.B.2. Examples provided below regarding TCE-TCA-Freon-Vertrel
substitutions.
7 4 See MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 68, at 110. For a discussion of Vertrel, see
infra Part 1.B.2.
7 5 See supra notes 53 54 and accompanying text.
76 See infra Part IV.B.
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insulator and fire-repellant. 77 After it was too late, we learned that exposure to
asbestos caused thousands of workers to contract mesothelioma, asbestosis, or
lung cancer. 78 Many victims are now paid pennies on the dollar out of special
trust funds set up for asbestos exposure victims following the bankruptcy of
asbestos manufacturers, and the tort system's resolution of asbestos claims is
generally considered to be a "dismal failure." 7 9
Industry resistance to command and control regulations is also a recurrent
theme in these cases. Industry groups long resisted the adoption of OSIIA
regulations governing exposures to lead, mercury, silica dust, and other
hazardous substances.8" As with diacetyl, their strategy was largely based on
emphasizing scientific doubts about causation, in order to capitalize on the
"innocent until proven guilty" system of chemical regulation in the U.S. 8 1
2. Chemical Substitutions
The chemical-substitution theme is also familiar. The evolution of the
industrial chemical solvent degreaser industry provides another illustration of
the chemical substitution pattern. The chemical trichloroethylene (TCE), a
volatile organic chemical, was widely used as a degreaser in the manufacture of
electronic circuits and components until concerns about TCE's environmental
effects led the industry to replace it with trichloroethane (TCA), which has a
similar chemical structure. 82 TCE and TCA were among the most widely used
77 See Laura Hall et al., Litigating Toxic Risks Ahead of Regulation: Biomonitoring
Science in the Courtroom, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 42 (2012) (citing asbestos, lead, and
DDT as examples of toxins once thought to be safe); Frank J. Macchiarola, The Manville
Personal Injury Settlement Trust: Lessons for the Future, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 583, 588
(1996) (noting the properties and uses of asbestos); Richard A. Solomon, Comment,
Clearing the Air: Resolving the Asbestos Personal Injury Litigation Crisis, 2 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. REV. 125, 126 27 (1991) (describing the various applications of asbestos).
7 8 See Macchiarola, supra note 77, at 588 89 (describing the ailments caused by
exposure to asbestos); David Rosenberg, Book Review, The Dusting of America: A Story of
Asbestos Carnage, Cover-Up, and Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1693 (1986)
("Hundreds of thousands of these people have died or are dying from asbestos-related
diseases: asbestosis, mesothelioma, and lung cancer.").
7 9 See Joshua M. Silverstein, Overlooking Tort Claimants' Best Interests: Non-Debtor
Releases in Asbestos Bankruptcies, 78 UMKC L. REV. 1, 96 97, n.548 (2009) (quoting
James L. Stengel, The Asbestos End-Game, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 223, 262 (2006)).
80 McCluskey, supra note 71, at 772.
81 Id. at 772; see also MICHAELS, supra note 51, at 95 (discussing aromatic amines, and
stating, "Instead, the corporations' modus operandi was the same as it always is. Attack the
science. Ignore the science. Demand of the science something neither it nor any institution
possesses: absolute certainty.").
82 See Richard E. Doherty, A History of the Production and Use of Carbon
Tetrachloride, Tetrachloroethylene, Trichloroethylene, and 1,1, I-Trichloroethane in the
United States: Part 2 Trichloroethylene and 1,1,1-Trichloroethane, 1 J. ENVTL. FORENSICS
83, 83, 87-88 (2000). The use of TCA as a degreaser required the addition of a new type of
stabilizer to prevent reactions leading to corrosive byproducts. Id. at 90. The chemical 1,4
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industrial degreasers, and they are now found in many of the hazardous cleanup
sites listed on the National Priorities List.83 TCA, in turn, was replaced as a
degreaser by chlorofluorocarbons such as Freon when ozone depletion concerns
were raised about TCA in the 1990s. 84 The use of Freon as a chemical degreaser
was eventually phased out due to its own health and environmental concerns.85
Now, new mixtures of solvents are being used in vapor degreasing. DuPont has
introduced a line of chemical degreasers under the brand name Vertrel that
includes the mixture of a well-known chlorinated solvent, trans 1,2
dichloroethylene (trans-i,2 DCE), and a DuPont-patented fluorocarbon known
as HFC-43-10mee. 86 HFC-43-10mee has been the subject of some toxicity
testing, including some genetic testing, and DuPont claims that these studies
demonstrate its low toxicity. 87 Based on the testing, DuPont has recommended
certain acceptable exposure limits for HFC-43-1 Omee, but these suggested
limits have not been verified,88 and OSHA has not yet adopted a PEL for the
chemical. 8 9
The substitution of new chemicals in the manufacture of degreasing
solvents might be thought to represent an admirable desire to replace chemicals
that pose dangers to human health or to the environment with safer chemicals.
But the history of chemical manufacturer action and inaction shows that
chemical companies will generally resist phase-outs of profitable chemicals
dioxane became a widely-used TCA stabilizer, and 1,4 dioxane itself is now suspected of
presenting its own environmental and health concerns. See generally ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
OPPT CHEMICAL FACT SHEET, 1,4 DIOXANE FACT SHEET: SUPPORT DOCUMTN (CAS No.
123-9-1) (1995).
8 3 See Doherty, supra note 82, at 83, 87. As of 1997, TCE was reported as being
present at 852 of 1438 National Priority List sites. Id. at 83. TCA was "by far the most used,
easiest, and efficient cleaning solvent." Id. at 87 88 (quoting a spokesman for the chemical
industry).84 1d. at 91 (noting that TCA was still used as an intermediate product because "many
potential CFC replacements used TCA as a feedstock").8 5 See MICHAELS, supra note 51, at 45 (describing the efforts of DuPont to attack the
science implicating Freon in ozone depletion prior to governmental action to ban
fluorocarbons).
86 The fluorocarbon HFC-43-10mee is also known as 1,1,1,2,2,3,4,5,5,5-
decafluoropentane, CAS No. 138495-42-8. See DUPONT, MSDS FOR VETREL SDG
SPECIALTY FLUID 2 (2011) [hereinafter MSDS FOR VETREL SDG SPECIALTY FLUID],
available at http://msds.dupont.com/msds/pdfs/EN/PEN 09004a35804fa7a7.pdf. The
MSDS for each product in the Vertrel line of specialty fluids are available at
http://www2.dupont.com/Vertrel/en US/tech info/msds.html. Vertrel is a registered
trademark of E.I. duPont de Nemours and Company.
8 7 See, e.g., MSDS FOR VETREL SDG SPECIALTY FLUID, supra note 86, at 7-8.
8 8 See AUSTRALIAN NAT'L INDUS. CHEMS. NOTIFICATION & ASSESSMENT SCHEME, FULL
PUBLIC REPORT ON HFC-43-1OMEE40 (1999), available at http://www.nicnas.gov.au/
publications/car/new/na/nafullr/naO600fr/na626fr.pdf.8 9 See MSDS FOR VETREL SDG SPECIALTY FLUID, supra note 86.
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until a suitable (and patented) substitute is discovered. 90 At that point, the
substitute is advertised as "safe," even when toxicity information is insufficient
for regulators to confidently draw that conclusion.
3. Assertion of Trade Secret Protection
The assertion of trade secret protection as a block to information generation
and transparency is another familiar theme. 9 1  The OSHA Hazard
Communication Standard expressly permits a manufacturer to withhold from a
Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) the chemical ingredients or composition of
a substance, under certain conditions, if the manufacturer asserts a trade secret
protection over that information. 92 The effect of this roadblock was recently
publicized in the response to the Deepwater Horizon oil well failure in the Gulf
of Mexico. In the initial response to the spill, chemical dispersants called
Corexit 9527A and Corexit 9500A were used to disperse crude oil leaking from
the failed well. 93 The dispersants were used directly on the surface of the spill,
90 The chemical substitution strategy is not limited to U.S. industry. The now-Assistant
Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health, David Michaels, provides another
example of dubious chemical substitution in the British rubber industry in response to cancer
outbreaks among workers exposed to the chemical beta-Napthylamine (BNA). See
MICHAELS, supra note 51, at 26 (after eliminating the use of BNA, the British rubber
industry "continued to rely on other aromatic amines as antioxidants, several of which were
later determined to be bladder carcinogens, and rubber workers paid for this practice with
increased risk of bladder cancer for years").
91 This may include assertions of trade secret protection over scientific information in a
manufacturer's possession, such as internal research studies (like the one conducted by
BASF on diacetyl in 1993) suggesting that a product has unexpected health risks. See
MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 68, at 97; see also CARL F. CRANOR, LEGALLY
POISONED: HOW THE LAW PUTS US AT RISK FROM ToXICANTS 6 (2011) ("Of the
approximately 50,000 new substances introduced since 1979, about eighty-five percent had
no data concerning health effects; even the chemical identity of a majority of them is veiled
by claims of confidential business information. At current rates, testing these products after
they are already in commerce could take hundreds of years.").92 OSHA Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2011). On March 26, 2012,
OSHA published a final rule revising the Hazard Communication Standard. See 77 Fed. Reg.
17,574 (Mar. 26, 2012). The most significant revision to the standard was the adoption of the
United Nations Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals
(GHS), Revision 3. See id The revised standard also requires that safety data sheets include
certain enumerated sections and headings. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g) (2012). Chemical
manufacturers and employers must comply with most of the revised provisions of the rule by
June 1, 2015. See id. § 1910.1200(j). The revised standard retains, with no modifications
material to this discussion, provisions permitting employers and chemical manufacturers to
withhold information about specific chemical identities and concentrations under an
assertion of trade secret protection. See id § 1910.1200(i).
9 3 See Elana Schor, Ingredients of Controversial Dispersants Used on Gulf Spill Are
Secrets No More, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/06/09/
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as well as underwater. 94 Corexit 9527A was used in early response efforts. 95
When initial concerns arose about Corexit 9527A's potential toxicity to the
ecosystem and to workers exposed to the substance during surface operations, it
was replaced by Corexit 9500A.96 Nalco Holding Co., the manufacturer of
Corexit, initially asserted that the chemical compositions of the Corexit
dispersants were trade secrets. 97 Only after public pressure (and potential
worker exposures) did the EPA ultimately release the specific chemical
components in the two versions of Corexit.9 8 The health effects of exposure to
either version of Corexit, along with their environmental effects, remain largely
unknown. 99 The manufacturer's MSDS for Corexit 9500A provides that "[n]o
toxicity studies have been conducted on this product."' 0 0 After cleanup efforts
began in the Gulf, the EPA began independent toxicity testing on the Corexit
dispersants.10 1 According to the EPA, initial toxicity testing results suggest that
the Corexit dispersants are "no more or less toxic than the other available
alternatives." 102
4. Unique Aspects of the Diacetyl Story
Although similar themes tend to recur in chemical exposure stories, each
story also contains some unique aspects. Certain characteristics of diacetyl
09greenwire-ingredients-of-controversial-dispersants-used-42891.html; see also U.S. Envtl.
Protect. Agency, Press Conference Call 19-22 (May 12, 2010) [hereinafter EPA Conference
Call], available at http://www.epa.gov/bpspilldispersants/may 12transcript-final.pdf.94 EPA Conference Call, supra note 93.
9 5 See Schor, supra note 93.
96 The chemical 2-butoxyethanol, an ingredient in Corexit 9527A, has been linked to
"lingering health problems experienced by cleanup workers after the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil
spill." Id. One of the newly-revealed chemical ingredients of Corexit is dioctyl sodium
sulfosuccinate, "a detergent and common ingredient in laxatives." Id.
97 See id.
9 8 See id. Although the disclosure of the purportedly proprietary ingredients in Corexit
will allow independent researchers to begin studying the long and short term risks of the
chemicals to potentially exposed workers, see id. (quoting Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand), the
disclosure will likely have only a limited effect because of the time needed to conduct the
testing. See id (quoting David Andrews, Senior Scientist at Environmental Working Group).
Additionally, the EPA disclosure did not include a description of the proportions in which
the chemical ingredients are used to make Corexit products. Id.
9 9 See generally Questions and Answers on Dispersants, ENVTL. PROTECT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants-qanda.html#effects (last visited Jun. 29, 2012)
(noting that "long term effects on aquatic life are unknown" and, with respect to human
health effects, referring to the Corexit MSDS).
10 0 NALCo, MATERIAL SAFETY DATA SHEET: PRODUCT COREXIT® EC9500A 5 (2008),
available at http://thepumphandle.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/corexit-9500a-msds.pdf.
10 1 See EPA Response to BP Spill in the Gulf of Mexico: Questions and Answers on
Dispersants, ENVTL. PROTECT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants-qanda.html
(last updated Oct. 14, 2011).
102 Id.
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exposure made proof of causation in tort suits somewhat less difficult for the
microwave popcorn employees than it typically is in chemical exposure cases.
First, the onset of bronchiolitis obliterans did not follow a long latency period.
Workers showed symptoms after a median of a year and a half of exposure in
the workplace. 10 3 Many cancers caused by chemical exposures are characterized
by long induction and latency periods, such that the cancer takes much longer to
detect. 10 4 Second, the specific disease at issue, bronchiolitis obliterans, is rare
and is sometimes characterized as a "signature disease" that is traceable to
exposure to diacetyl. 10 5 Smoking, which is often blamed by employers for
workers' contraction of respiratory ailments, cannot cause bronchiolitis
obliterans. 10 6 For these reasons, it proved easier than usual to directly connect
the chemical diacetyl to the workers' respiratory diseases. It was easier for the
diacetyl workers to convince their employers to stop denying workers'
compensation claims and to extract tort settlements from diacetyl manufacturers
than it is for claimants in the typical workplace exposure case. At least one
study suggests that most victims of occupational disease never obtain
compensation through the workers' compensation system; according to the 2004
study, workers' compensation fails to compensate an estimated 98.9% of deaths
due to occupational diseases. 107
The diacetyl story is just one illustration of how our three-pronged worker
safety regime fails to produce efficient levels of risk, precaution, and
compensation for injury. Disease caused by occupational exposures will remain
a concern as long as we continue to innovate, discover new processes, and
develop and market new chemical compounds.108
10 3 See Dulberg, supra note 25, at 106 n.173.
104 See CRANOR, supra note 91, at 57.
10 5 See Dulberg, supra note 25, at 105. Another signature disease unique to a particular
exposure is mesothelioma, which is caused only by exposure to asbestos. See MICHAELS,
supra note 51, at 61-62 (noting that other than the "few very rare instances" of signature
diseases, "epidemiologists cannot state that a specific chemical exposure has definitely
caused the cancer of a specific patient").106 See Dulberg, supra note 25, at 105 06; see also MICHAELS, supra note 51, at 62
("The lung cancer from asbestos is indistinguishable from the lung cancer from smoking.");
id at 177 (discussing abestos manufacturers blaming tobacco for lung ailments as part of
asbestos litigation).
10 7 See Leigh & Robbins, supra note 21, at 703.
108 For example, the development of nanotechnology threatens to widen the information
gap dramatically. See Lin, supra note 1, at 960 ("With the commercialization of
nanotechnology, a rapidly developing field that is creating substances with new physical and
chemical properties and often unknown toxicological effects, the information gap threatens
to expand into an information chasm."); see also Paul C. Sarahan, Nanotechnology Safety: A
Framework for Identifying and Complying with Workplace Safety Requirements, 5
NANOTECH. L. & Bus. 191, 191 (2008).
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III. MARKET FAILURE
Scholars have identified the likelihood of market failure in the context of
worker safety generally 10 9 and workplace disease in particular. 11  To
demonstrate the challenges that proposed reform to the workplace safety regime
must overcome, this Part identifies two types of market failure that justify
regulatory intervention. First, the labor market is unable to set accurate
compensating wage differentials for workers accepting riskier work when
workers have inadequate access to information about the risk. 11' Second, unique
characteristics of workplace diseases create negative externalities that allow
employers to foist some of the expected costs of workplace disease onto
others-including workers, health insurance providers, and the government
(and therefore, indirectly, taxpayers in general).
A. Information Failures Preclude Efficient Ex Ante Wage Differentials
The first prong of the current regime relies on the labor market to set
efficient compensating wage differentials for riskier jobs. 1 12 There is some
evidence of compensating wage differentials in the context of workplace
accidents and on-the-job fatalities. One recent estimate found that wages
increase about 1% for workers who accept jobs where the risk of fatality is
double the average risk of workplace fatality. 113 There remain questions about
whether the wage differentials demanded by employees for dangerous jobs tend
to be systematically too low or too high. 114
Whether or not the market is capable of setting accurate and efficient wage
differentials for workplace accidents and on-the-job fatalities, it certainly fares
10 9 See Lambert, supra note 9, at 1015.
110 See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 57 59.
111 See Lambert, supra note 9, at 1024; Viscusi, supra note 4, at 57 59.
112 See McGarity, supra note 9, at 100 ("Under this theory, workers will demand higher
wages to work under risky conditions and employers will have a natural incentive to install
risk-reduction technologies in dangerous workplaces. Over the long haul, the economy
should reach an equilibrium in which workers who consent to working under risky
conditions perform the dangerous jobs and employers install the optimum amount of risk
reduction technology." (footnote omitted)).
113 See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 245
(9th ed. 2006).
114 Compare SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE
REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 86-88 (1992) (arguing that information
problems, employers' monopsony powers, and workers' underestimation of the costs of
injury can lead to inadequate compensating wage differentials), and Peter Dorman & Paul
Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work Revisited, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
116, 116 (1998), with MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. KIP VISCUSI, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS
FOR JOB RISKS 74-75 (1990) (arguing that workers' estimates of risk generally correlate with
BLS statistics and that, if anything, workers tend to overestimate small probabilities of risk,
which may lead to compensating wage differentials that are too high).
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poorly in the context of workplace diseases. As Professor W. Kip Viscusi notes,
"Informational inadequacies and externalities associated with occupational
disease make the free market particularly ineffective in reducing occupational
disease risks and compensating disease victims."1 15 Employees generally
cannot observe the risks of exposures to chemicals and substances in the
workplace. For example, empirical studies found that workers in the asbestos
industry received no compensating wage premiums. 116 In part, this is due to
workers' lack of knowledge about the chemicals used. But even if workers
knew exactly what chemicals and substances were used in the plant, they would
still not have sufficient information about levels of exposure or the dose-
response data that could indicate the dangers of exposure. Individual employees
have no way to evaluate the dangers of exposure and are not in a position to
conduct toxicity or epidemiological studies on each chemical in order to
evaluate the risks.
Labor unions could mitigate this information problem, to some degree, by
combining the resources of many employees and developing and employing
scientific expertise. They can demand that the employer provide safety data and
coordinate or even fund scientific studies. The diacetyl case highlights the
potential role for unions, but also demonstrates the difficulty that unions face. In
the case of diacetyl, labor unions urged OSHA and other regulators to take
action to protect employees. 117 Despite union pressure, OSHA refused to adopt
an emergency temporary standard in light of the relative dearth of scientific
information on diacetyl and only recently began the process of considering a
permanent standard for diacetyl exposure. 118 Further, union membership
continues to decline; unions now represent less than 12% of the workforce. 119 If
this trend continues, organized labor will not have the resources to generate the
115 Viscusi, supra note 4, at 57-58 (footnote omitted); see also McCluskey, supra note
71, at 773 ("Most commentators assume that workers generally will have more difficulty
bargaining for wage premiums to compensate for occupational diseases than for the
paradigmatic industrial accident because of workers' greater difficulty in obtaining timely
and accurate information about the risks of diseases." (citing, among others, NICHOLAS A.
ASHFORD & CHARLES C. CALDART, TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT
226-28 (1991))).116 McCluskey, supra note 71, at 774 (citing MT. SINAI SCH. OF MED., DISABILITY
COMPENSATION FOR ASBESTOS ASSOCIATED DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES, 577-85 (Irving
J. Selikoffed., 1982)).
117 Letter from Joseph T. Hansen, Int'l President, United Food & Commercial Workers
Int'l Union, and James P. Hoffa, Gen. President, Int'l Blid. of Teamsters, to Elaine L. Chao,
Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor (July 26, 2006).
118 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
1 19 Zev J. Eigen & David Sherwyn, A Moral/Contractual Approach to Labor Law
Reform, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 695, 700 (2012).
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information necessary to help the free market achieve efficient levels of risk and
precaution. 120
B. Negative Externalities Prevent the Efficient Imposition of Ex Post
Compensation Costs on Employers
The labor market fails to set efficient levels of risk and precaution for a
second reason: employers are able to externalize much of the expected costs of
risky behavior, and therefore do not take those expected costs into consideration
when adjusting their risk and precaution levels. If the labor market were
efficient, employers would set the level of precaution at the point where the
marginal cost of an additional unit of precaution exactly equals the marginal
benefit to the employer in avoiding costs from worker injury or disease, leading
to the optimal distribution of risk and precaution. If employers can externalize a
sizable portion of their expected costs from worker disease, then they will
systematically take too little precaution.
Professor Thomas Lambert contends that this market failure in workplace
safety regulation is limited to the systematic informational inadequacy outlined
in the preceding section, and that there is no technological negative externality
permitting employers to foist some costs of risk onto others. 121 Professor
Lambert claims that costs that appear to be imposed on workers from workplace
injuries are actually internalized by the employer via the price mechanism for
labor, through the combined labor price components of ex ante compensating
wage differentials (discussed above) and the payment of ex post compensation
for injuries. 122 In other words, Professor Lambert acknowledges the information
problem preventing workers from negotiating ex ante wage differentials, but
believes that a workable solution to that information problem would fully right
the ship. For the reasons that follow, Professor Lambert's view is too
optimistic-at least as to chemical exposures.
Absent a workers' compensation system, employees would be required to
seek ex post compensation for injuries or illnesses via the tort system, and the
amount of ex post costs actually borne by the employer would be dependent
upon the efficacy of the tort system in setting appropriate and efficient liability
rules. Under our current workers' compensation system, including the common
use of workers' compensation insurance, employers typically bear any ex post
costs in the form of increased workers' compensation insurance premiums. In
other words, the additional insurance premium that relatively risky employers
pay for workers' compensation insurance will theoretically lead employers to
internalize the expected costs of injury and accordingly set efficient risk and
120 See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 59 ("Unions can have only a limited effect on the
occupational health problem, however, since they represent only about twenty percent of the
nation's workers.").
121 Lambert, supra note 9, at 1009 (contending that "the primary market failure with
respect to hazardous substances in the workplace is inadequate information").
122 Lambert, supra note 9, at 1017 24.
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precaution levels. Professor Lambert acknowledges some potential "leaks" in
the current workers' compensation system that will permit some residual
externalization of ex post costs by the employer, including: imperfect insurance
pricing; the costs of litigating and adjudicating workers' compensation claims
(some of which is borne by others, including the claimant and the government);
the systematic under-compensation of claims due to statutory damage caps and
restrictions on certain types of damages, including pain and suffering; and the
administrative costs borne by taxpayers in connection with state-administered
specialized funds for certain types of easily identified worker injuries. 123 But,
argues Lambert, "economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that the other
adjustable element of worker price, worker wages, works in tandem with
workers' compensation to ensure that leaks in the injury compensation scheme
do not create technological negative externalities that necessitate substantive
safety standards."'124 Where compensation benefits are low, workers will
demand higher risk premiums, and vice versa, allowing the two components to
complement each other. 12 5
Professor Lambert's claim has some force with respect to workplace
accidents, injuries, and on-the-job fatalities. Empirical studies suggest that
workers do receive a compensating wage differential for taking jobs that are
objectively risky126 or perceived to be risky. 127 For ordinary workplace injuries,
these risk premiums might arguably make up for the leaks Professor Lambert
acknowledges in the workers' compensation system-at least roughly. But on
the question of technological negative externalities, Professor Lambert
overlooks the significant potential for negative externalities caused by certain
unique characteristics of workplace disease. Employee access to information is
not the only problem in the context of worker disease. Three characteristics of
workplace disease lead to technological negative externalities that are not cured
simply by employee access to information:
(1) The typical lack of scientific evidence that exposure to a chemical or
substance at a given level causes the development of a particular
disease makes proof of causation difficult for employees and often
prevents any ex post compensation for the disease.
(2) Even where a chemical or substance is recognized as a potential cause,
the lack of scientific understanding regarding the significance of
1231d. at 1019 20.
124 Id. at 1021. This argument highlights the importance of correcting the market failure
that Professor Lambert does acknowledge, incomplete information, to ensure that
compensating wage differentials fully internalize for the employer the costs imposed by the
identified leaks in the ex post compensation scheme.
12 51d. at 1022 23.
126See, e.g., W. KIP Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN
THE WORKPLACE 44 (1983) (risk premiums for objectively risky jobs).
12 7 W. Kip Viscusi, EMPLOYMENT HAZARDS: AN INVESTIGATION OF MARKET
PERFORMANCE 263 (1979) (concluding that employees in occupations perceived to be risky
receive a compensating wage differential).
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potential contributing factors to the disease, such as genetic
predisposition, cigarette smoking, and eating habits, often further
complicates the causation issue. This provides employers with plausible
defenses to compensation claims, preventing ex post compensation. 128
(3) Many workplace diseases manifest themselves only after a long latency
period, further compounding the causation difficulties and making it
difficult to connect the costs of any particular worker's disease with a
particular employer's prior risk-taking behavior. Long latency periods
may also trigger limitations defenses under some state workers'
compensation statutes, preventing the employer from internalizing the
costs of worker disease. 129
Because of these unique characteristics, the ex post workers' compensation
scheme breaks down for many workplace diseases caused by exposures to
hazardous chemicals or substances. 130 Employers are able to externalize much
of the expected costs of workplace disease onto other individuals or groups,
including the workers, their families, social security taxpayers, health insurance
premium payers, and members of industry-wide insurance pools. 131 The
available empirical evidence confirms this. Studies of the costs of workplace
diseases suggest that employers benefit from a large negative externality;
12 8 Viscusi, supra note 4, at 54 ("Although well-defined scientific relationships exist in
some instances, most diseases may be caused by exposure to any one of several substances,
or by participation in any one of several activities." (footnote omitted)); see also Ellen R.
Peirce & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Workers' Compensation and Occupational Disease: A
Return to Original Intent, 67 OR. L. REV. 649, 650-51 (1988) (describing "dual causation"
cases and arguing that the failure of apportionment can thwart the objectives or workers'
compensation).12 9 See Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substances
Litigation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 965, 969, 973 (1988) (discussing the successful use of statute
of limitations defenses in asbestos cases); Laura Rowinski, Comment, Genetic Testing in the
Workplace, 4 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 375, 391-92 (1988) (examining the effect of
workers' compensation limitation provisions on worker disease claims); Viscusi, supra note
4, at 63. See generally Jordan H. Leibman & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Time Limitations
Under State Occupational Disease Acts, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 287, 303-43 (1985) (providing a
comprehensive survey of the treatment of "delayed manifestation occupational diseases"
under the limitations provisions of various state workers' compensation statutes).
13 0 See Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 128, at 679.
131 Viscusi, supra note 4, at 59 n.33 (citing Albert Nichols & Richard Zeckhauser,
OSHA After a Decade: A Time for Reason, in CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION: REVOLUTION
AND REFORM 202, 208 09 (Leonard W. Weiss & Michael W. Klass eds., 1981)); see also
Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 128, at 679-80 ("[M]uch of the cost of industrial disease is
not being made part of the cost of the product and passed on to the consumer. Instead, the
burden of occupational disease is carried by the injured employee and public support
systems such as social security and welfare. To the extent that occupational disease injuries
escape the workers' compensation system, society at large pays for occupational disease
through public programs rather than through market mechanisms.").
2012]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
employers may be able to externalize over ninety percent of the costs of risky
behavior leading to deadly workplace diseases. 132
The externalities in the context of workplace disease are significantly worse
than the comparatively minor "leaks" in ex post compensation identified by
Professor Lambert. And, as discussed above, the empirical evidence on wage
differentials suggests that for workplace diseases like asbestosis, workers did
not receive ex ante risk compensation. The negative externalities, combined
with the information deficiencies that preclude employees from obtaining an
efficient wage differential, "make the free market particularly ineffective in
reducing occupational disease risks and compensating disease victims." 133
IV. FAILURE OF THE CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME
As shown above, the free market does not drive employers to set efficient
levels of risk and precaution for workplace disease. The consequences of this
failure justify some form of regulatory intervention in the area. But what type of
regulation is most likely to correct the market failure, set efficient levels of risk
and precaution, and also adequately compensate injured employees? A narrowly
tailored regulatory regime targeting the identified market failures will correct
the inefficiencies yet avoid overly broad restrictions on the operation of the
labor market. 134 In this Part, I evaluate the status quo regulatory responses to
the problem of workplace disease and demonstrate the ways in which they are
ill-suited to correcting the market failures and meeting the dual goals of
preventing unreasonable risks and compensating employees for the expected
costs of occupational disease.
A. State Workers' Compensation Statutes. A Breakdown of the Implicit
Social Bargain in Chemical Exposure Cases
In theory, state workers' compensation laws should correct the market
failure by providing ex post compensation to injured workers and increasing the
cost of risky behavior by employers. In practice, current state workers'
compensation laws are terrible vehicles for allocating the expected costs of
occupational diseases caused by chemical exposures. Workers' compensation
laws often include a requirement that, to be compensable, an injury must be the
result of an "accident."' 135 As occupational diseases came to be recognized as a
problem, a concern arose that an "accident" requirement would preclude
recovery for illnesses caused by chronic exposures over time that were not the
132 See Leigh & Robbins, supra note 21, at 703; see also McCluskey, supra note 71, at
775-76.
133 Viscusi, supra note 4, at 57-58.
134 See Lambert, supra note 9, at 1008 ("Regulatory mismatch occurs when the
government adopts a regulation that is too broad (or perhaps too narrow) to provide a
tailored fit to the problem it is supposed to correct.").13 5 Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 128, at 656.
1412 [Vol. 73:6
REGULATING WORKPLACE CHEMICALS
result of a single, identifiable accident. 136 In recognition of this, many states
adopted, either separately or as a component part of their workers'
compensation laws, statutory provisions that relaxed the accident requirement
and provided compensation for certain occupational diseases. 137
The most common approach is a general one, in which the state workers'
compensation statute includes "occupational disease" as a compensable injury,
without identifying any specific diseases. In Missouri, for example,
"occupational disease" is defined as:
[A]n identifiable disease arising with or without human fault out of and in the
course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the general
public is exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable, except
where the diseases follow as an incident of an occupational disease as defined
in this section. 138
Occupational diseases are compensable under the Missouri statute "only if the
occupational exposure was the prevailing factor in causing both the resulting
medical condition and disability." 139
States taking this generalized approach uniformly place the burden of proof
on the claimant to establish that the disease falls under the coverage of the
statute, although the articulation of this burden can vary. The West Virginia law
illustrates a typical statement of the burden. There, a claimant bears the burden
of proving:
(1) that there is a direct causal connection between the conditions under which
[the] work is performed and the [] disease; (2) [the disease] can be seen to have
followed as a natural incident ... of the employment; (3) [the disease] can be
fairly traced to the employment as the proximate cause; (4) [the disease] does
not come from a hazard to which [the employee] would have been equally
exposed outside of the employment; (5) [the disease] is incidental to the
character of the [employment] and not [outside] the.., employer/employee
[relationship]; and (6) [the disease] appears to have had its origin in a risk
connected [to] the employment .... 140
Claimants in many states, including Arizona, 141 Colorado, 142 Georgia, 143
Hawaii,144 Indiana, 145 iowa, 146 Nevada, 14 7 Oklahoma, 148 South Carolina, 149
1361d. at 656 58.
137/d. at 659 ("In addition, several states scheduled diseases which were clearly
occupationally related. If the disease was not scheduled, it was not compensated.").
13 8 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.067.1 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012).
13 9 1d. § 287.067.2.
140 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-1(f) (LexisNexis 2010); see also Clark v. State
Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 187 S.E.2d 213, 216 (W. Va. 1972).
141 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-901(13)(c), 23-901.01 (2012); see also In re Estate of
Bedwell, 104 Ariz. 443, 444 (1969).
142 COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-40-201(14) (2011); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Indus.
Claims Office, 989 P.2d 251, 252 (Colo. App. 1999).
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Tennessee, 150 Virginia, 151 and Wyoming 152 must meet similarly onerous
burdens to show that a disease is compensable under the applicable statute.
Arguably more forgiving statements of the claimant's burden are found in
other states taking the general approach. For example, Montana requires that the
claimant show "with a reasonable degree of medical certainty" that the disease
was caused by the occupation. 153 In Illinois, the claimant must show that it is
''apparent to the rational mind ... [that] a causal connection [exists] between
the [work conditions] and the occupational disease."1 54 Claimants in Kentucky
must establish that "[a] rational mind ... [can see] a causal connection between
the conditions under which the work is performed and the occupational disease,
and which can be seen to have followed as a natural incident" of the work
exposure. 155 in New Jersey, a claimant must prove that the disease is "due in a
material degree" to conditions characteristic of the particular trade. 156
Despite their minor variations, all these states place on the claimant the
burden of proof on the critical question-whether a workplace exposure caused
the disease. This allows a lack of scientific evidence on causation to inure to the
benefit of employers, discourages the development of new toxicity information,
and leads to excessive risk-taking and inadequate precautions by employers and
chemical manufacturers.
A minority of states take a more targeted approach to occupational disease:
one that might be referred to as a "disease scheduling" approach. Ultimately,
this approach is no more effective in correcting the failure of the labor market
than the generalized approach. New York is illustrative of the disease
scheduling approach. New York's workers' compensation statute provides a
14 3 GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-280(2) (2008).
14 4 HAW. REV. STAT. § 386-3(a) (West 2008); see also Flor v. Holguin, 9 P.3d 382, 392-
93 (Haw. 2000).
14 5 IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-10 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012); see also Schwitzer-
Cummins Co. v. Hacker, 112 N.E.2d 221, 230 (Ind. App. 1953).
14 6 IOWA CODE ANN. § 85A.8 (West 2009).
14 7 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 617.440, 617.358 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011).
14 8 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 308(33) (West 2012); see also Superior Stucco v.
Daniels, 912 P.2d 317, 318 (Okla. 1995).
14 9 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 42-11-40, 42-11-10(A) (Supp. 2011).
150 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-6-301, 50-6-303 (2008 & Supp. 2011); see also Lyons v.
Holston Def. Corp., 142 F. Supp. 848, 851 (E.D. Tenn. 1956).
151 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-400, -403 (2007); see also Blue Diamond Coal Co. v.
Pannell, 122 S.E.2d 666, 669 (Va. 1961).
15 2 Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-14-102(xi)(A), 27-14-603(a) (2011); see also Olson v. Fed.
Am. Partners, 567 P.2d 710, 713 n.3 (Wyo. 1977).
153 MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119(5) (2011); see also Schieno v. City of Billings, 683
P.2d 953, 955 (Mont. 1984).
154 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 310/1 (d) (West 2011); see also Gross v. Ill. Workers'
Comp. Comm'n, 960 N.E.2d 587, 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
15 5 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.0011(3) (LexisNexis 2011).
15 6 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-31(a) (West 2011); see also Bayer v. Frank P. Farrell, Inc.,
174 A.2d 221, 224 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961).
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schedule of specific compensable diseases and accompanying job processes. 157
Employees have the right to compensation under the statute only if (with an
exception discussed below) their "disability or death is caused by one of the
diseases mentioned in [the schedule], and the disease is due to the nature of the
corresponding employment as described in [the schedule]."'1 58 For instance, the
New York schedule of diseases lists "[a]rsenic poisoning or its sequelae"
corresponding to "[a]ny process involving the use of or direct contact with
arsenic or its preparations or compounds."1 59 Similar disease schedules are
found in Idaho, 160 Maryland, 16 1 North Carolina, 162 Pennsylvania, 163 and Rhode
Island. 164
These disease scheduling schemes plainly operate only after it is too late-
too little precaution has already been taken in an industry, clusters of employees
have developed diseases that can be causally connected to the job, and then a
specific illness-occupation combination is added to the law. This is of no help in
redressing the market failures that led employers to systematically take too
much risk in the first place. Nor does it adjust either ex ante or ex post
compensation for those employees who were injured prior to the scheduling of
the illness-occupation pairing in the statute. Once there is sufficient, established
evidence of a substance's toxicity (such as arsenic) to justify adding the pairing
to the schedule, then the market may be capable of setting appropriate
compensating wage differentials if the information can be effectively
communicated to employees and potential employees. More importantly,
employees will be able to successfully recover ex post compensation for such
exposures under any workers' compensation scheme by proving causation with
the well-established evidence on the toxic substance. Perhaps just as likely, the
chemical at issue (or even the entire industry) will finally be deemed too
dangerous to justify the compensating wages or workers' compensation costs,
and its use will be discontinued. The diacetyl story illustrates the point. Any
amendments to one of the disease scheduling statutes that adds the combination
of "bronchiolitis obliterans/use of diacetyl" will come too late in the day to
affect the prior inefficient risk/precaution behavior of diacetyl manufacturers
and microwave popcorn producers. The microwave popcorn manufacturers
have already moved on to the untested substitutes for diacetyl.
Recognizing this problem, states that follow the disease scheduling
approach also include a "catch-all" provision in their worker disease statutes.
15 7 See N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW §§ 3, 47 (McKinney Supp. 2012).
15 81d. § 39.
159/d. § 3.2 no. 6. A copy of the New York schedule of processes and occupational
diseases located in § 3 is reproduced herein at Appendix.
160 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-438 (Supp. 2012).
161 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-503 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011) (for limited public
safety occupations, such as firefighters and police officers).
162 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53 (2011).
163 77 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1208 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012).
164 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-34-2 (2003 & Supp. 2011).
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For example, the schedule in the New York statute contains this combination as
entry number thirty on the schedule: "Any and all occupational diseases"
corresponding to "[a]ny and all employments enumerated in subdivision one of
section three of this chapter," which provides a list of "hazardous
employments," broadly defined to include most jobs. 165
Despite the seeming promise of such catch-alls, in practice they too fail to
redress the information deficiency. Court interpretations of the catch-all
provisions have imposed stringent requirements akin to those found in states
taking the generalized approach. In New York, for example, the catch-all has
been interpreted to apply only to diseases that arise from a particular, unusual
aspect of the job. 166 Thus, the catch-all provisions suffer from the same
shortcomings as the provisions governing listed diseases. Identification of a
disease-occupation combination comes too late to efficiently set risk/precaution
levels.
A few jurisdictions employ some form of a presumption in favor of the
claimant to shift the burden of production (but not the burden of persuasion) on
causation. In Alaska, for example, the claimant obtains the benefit of this
presumption after showing a "preliminary link" between the disability and his
or her employment. 16 7 To trigger the presumption, "the claimant need not
present substantial evidence that his or her employment was a substantial cause
of [the] disability."' 168 Once the preliminary link is established, "it is the
employer's burden to overcome the presumption by coming forward with
substantial evidence that the injury was not work related.' 16 9 If the employer
successfully rebuts the presumption in this manner, then the presumption "drops
out and the employee must prove all the elements of the case by a
preponderance of the evidence." 170
The Alaska Supreme Court has applied this presumption in cases involving
occupational exposure to hazardous substances. In a case involving asthma
allegedly caused by occupational exposure to sulfur dioxide and chlorine gas,
the court found that the claimant had shown the required preliminary link by
offering a physician's testimony that he believed the employee's "disease [was]
secondary to airborne chemical burn ... perpetuated by continued exposure to
sulfur dioxide and chlorine."'17 1 The court held that the Alaska Workers'
Compensation Board, in denying the employee's claim, had improperly
16 5N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 3.2 no. 30 (McKinney Supp. 2012); see also infra
Appendix.
166 See Goldberg v. 954 Marcy Corp., 12 N.E.2d 311, 313 (N.Y. 1938).
16 7 La. Pac. Corp. v. Koons, 816 P.2d 1379, 1381 (Alaska 1991) (quoting Cheeks v.
Wismer & Becker, 742 P.2d 239, 243 44 (Alaska 1987)); see also ALASKA STAT.
§ 23.30.120(a)(1) (2010).
16 8 Koons, 816 P.2d at 1381 (alterations in original) (quoting Cheeks, 742 P.2d at 243-
44).
1691d. (quoting Burgess Constr. Co. v. Smallwood, 698 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska 1985)).
170 Id.
171 Id. (alteration in original).
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required the claimant to establish that his asthma was work-related, rather than
requiring the employer to overcome the presumption by showing that the
asthma was not caused by his employment. 172
The District of Columbia workers' compensation statute contains a similar
presumption, but it is less clear how that presumption would be applied in cases
involving exposures to hazardous chemicals. 173 The small minority of
jurisdictions employing a presumption in favor of the claimant may be more
effective at responding to the market failure, but they are not complete
solutions, as I demonstrate below in Part VI. In any event, they are
overshadowed by the vast majority of U.S. jurisdictions that place the burden of
proving disease causation squarely on the claimant.
Aside from their inability to adjust the risk/precaution behavior of chemical
manufacturers and employers, current state worker disease laws also fail to
meet the second goal of workers' compensation programs: providing adequate
compensation for victims without imposing prohibitive litigation costs. The
implicit social bargain justifying workers' compensation schemes is that
employers will benefit from defined and limited liability, while employees will
benefit from quick adjudication without requiring the employee to establish
negligence. 174 But this supposed social bargain does little or no good for
workplace disease victims. Relieving employees of the burden of proving
negligence is of little comfort when they still bear the burden of establishing
that an exposure directly caused or contributed to a disease-the precise issue
on which scientific evidence usually is lacking, or at least is vigorously disputed
by the employer. Indeed, the legal conclusion that an employer was negligent
would often follow directly if there were substantial scientific evidence showing
that exposure to a particular chemical at certain levels directly caused or
contributed to the disease in question. 175 Quick, cheap adjudications are an
unfulfilled promise in the realm of worker disease, precisely because of the lack
172/d. at 1382.
17 3 D.C. CODE § 32-1510 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); see also Georgetown Univ. v. D.C.
Dep't of Emp't Servs., 971 A.2d 909, 916 (D.C. 2009) (occupational diseases are "injuries"
under the statute, which contains a statutory presumption of compensability, if they "arise
out of and in the natural course of employment").
174 See, e.g, McCluskey, supra note 71, at 670.
175 Compare this proof problem to the quintessential workplace accidental injury case, in
which an employee loses a limb while operating industrial machinery. There, the causal
connection between the work and the harm is not in doubt the operation of the machine
obviously led to the loss of limb. But the question of whether the employer was negligent
could be complicated and difficult to resolve. The employer may have taken all reasonable
precautions to ensure the safety of the machine. The tort doctrines of contributory or
comparative negligence or assumption of risk might apply if the employee removed a safety
device, operated the machine while impaired, or was simply inattentive. The implicit social
bargain of workers' compensation removes these roadblocks to recovery for employees.
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of available scientific causation information. Worker disease claims are
disputed three times more often than ordinary injury claims. 176
Although employees get little or no benefit from the supposed social
bargain, workers' compensation statutes still limit the recovery available to
employees and bar tort claims based on workplace exposures. For example, in
most states, the workers' compensation law provides that employees may not
recover for nondisabling pain and suffering. 177 Further, this limited workers'
compensation remedy is the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer,
unless the worker can fit within the intentional tort exception. 178 To fit within
the intentional tort exception, the employee must establish "an intentional or
deliberate act by the employer directed at causing harm to this particular
employee."1 7 9 Of course, this standard is virtually impossible to meet where
there is little evidence on the toxicity of a chemical or substance. How could an
employer have intended to harm the employee by exposing her to a chemical
when the science on the chemical is murky? The result is that a worker
suffering from workplace disease bears all the burdens imposed by the implicit
social bargain of the workers' compensation system, including the inability to
bring a tort claim against his employer and statutory damage limitations, but he
gets none of the supposed benefits of that social bargain.
B. The Tort System Fails as an Alternative Source of Ex Post
Compensation
As the diacetyl story illustrates, workers sometimes look for an alternative
source of ex post compensation for occupational disease by suing chemical
manufacturers in tort. 180  Although some microwave popcorn workers
successfully obtained jury verdicts or settlements, this was due in large part to
the unique characteristics of bronchiolitis obliterans. For most workplace
17 6 See also McCluskey, supra note 71, at 776 (noting that causation disputes and other
issues lead employers to challenge disease claims at higher rates than worker injury claims,
and citing an earlier study finding that employers contest disease claims at six times the rate
of other work injury claims).
17 7 See Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals
of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 163, 204 n.247 (2004) (citing 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K.
LARSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW § 1.03[4] (2003)); McCluskey, supra note 71, at
809; Viscusi, supra note 4, at 62.
178See, e.g., N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 11 (McKinney Supp. 2012); Mylroie v.
GAF Corp., 81 A.D.2d 994, 995 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); see also McCluskey, supra note 71,
at 809; Viscusi, supra note 4, at 68.
179 Mylroie, 81 A.D.2d at 995.
18 0 Viscusi, supra note 4, at 65 ("Over the past decade, however, disease victims have
attempted to circumvent the restrictions of workers' compensation programs by bringing
products liability claims against the manufacturers of hazardous materials used in the
workplace.").
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diseases, the tort system is generally thought to be ill-equipped to resolve such
claims, as several commentators have recognized. 181
The tort system does not cure the information problem, but rather
exacerbates it. Whether suing in strict liability or negligence, courts still require
the plaintiff to prove that exposure to the chemical in question proximately
caused the plaintiffs illness.' 8 2 Manufacturers still have an incentive to avoid
developing new information. This ignorance incentive is enhanced by other
features of the tort system. Under a strict liability defective product theory, for
example, a worker will often be required to show that a chemical product was
"unreasonably dangerous."1 83 This will typically require a showing of both
toxicity and precaution cost information. Even under a strict liability failure-to-
warn theory, the worker will be required to establish that the manufacturer
failed to warn of a "particular risk" which was "known or knowable in light of
the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge
available at the time."1 84 Additionally, statutes of limitation and long latency
periods will impede tort recovery. 185 Given the proof required to succeed even
under strict liability claims, chemical manufacturers have strong incentives to
avoid the development of new scientific information.
The tort system does not correct the labor market failure and will not lead to
efficient allocations of risk and precaution on employee exposures for several
reasons identified by Professor Viscusi: information deficiencies, high
transaction costs impeding settlements, insurance pooling that allows
manufacturers to spread the risk of large judgments and thereby dilute
181 See, e.g., Lin, supra note 1, at 966 (arguing that the tort system "discourages
manufacturers from producing toxicity information, encourages manufacturers to hinder
third-party efforts to develop such information, and renders effective enforcement of the
duty to test impossible"); Viscusi, supra note 4, at 66 (arguing that "tort suits provide a poor
mechanism for promoting efficient levels of health risk").
182 Viscusi, supra note 4, at 66; see also Lin, supra note 1, at 960 61 ("In reality,
however, environmental toxic tort plaintiffs are frustrated by gaps in knowledge regarding
causation, risk, and harm. Often the most significant of these obstacles is causation. Toxicity
testing has the potential to generate information on the ability of a chemical to cause illness,
but the lack of such testing often prevents plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie case.
Even when the available data is sufficient to support a regulatory response, it is usually
insufficient to support a finding of causation in an individual tort case." (footnotes omitted)).
18 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Viscusi, supra note 4, at 66; see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998) (defining a design
defect as "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced
or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other
distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe").
184 Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 558 (Cal. 1991)
(construing "comment j" of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) (negligent failure to warn); Viscusi, supra note 4, at 66.
185 Viscusi, supra note 4, at 68.
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incentives, and because the tort awards come many years after exposure,
preventing efficient incentive feedback to risk/precaution behavior. 186
C. OSHA Exposure Limits
Neither workers' compensation nor tort law corrects the market failures
described above. The OSH Act and OSHA regulations were intended to fill the
gap by setting minimum floors for worker safety, but they have not been up to
the task. OSHA's command and control regulations have been persistently
criticized from all sides since the OSH Act was enacted in 1970.187 Economists
criticize them as unnecessarily preventing gains from trade. 188 Other scholars
criticize the high burdens placed on OSHA for supporting and justifying any
command and control standards it seeks to impose on employers. The Supreme
Court requires that before OSHA may promulgate a permanent health or safety
standard, it must first make a threshold finding that a "significant risk" is
present that can be eliminated or reduced by a change in practices.189 Proposed
standards for exposures to toxic materials must also be shown to be feasible. 190
Additionally, OSHA is not permitted to presume that there is no safe exposure
level for a carcinogenic substance in the absence of specific dose-response
186 See id at 69 70. Professor Viscusi concludes: "In short, products liability law strives
both to compensate disease victims and deter workplace health risks. The inability of the
products liability system to achieve either goal suggests that the objectives of compensation
and reduced health risk must be addressed separately if both are to be achieved." Id at 70.
187See, e.g., Bisom-Rapp, supra note 51, at 1208-09 (describing historical criticism
from academics, business interests, and organized labor).
18 8 See Lambert, supra note 9, at 1010.
18 9 Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639-42 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (construing sections 3(8) and 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act, codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 652(8) and 655(b)(5), respectively) (sometimes referred to as the "Benzene Case"). In
determining whether a "significant risk" is present, OSHA often looks to a passage from the
plurality opinion by Justice Stevens in Industrial Union suggesting that a lifetime risk of
dying of cancer from a given exposure of one in one billion is insignificant, while a lifetime
risk of fatality of one in one thousand from a regular exposure is significant, and will justify
steps to decrease or eliminate the risk. Id. at 655; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA
Unconstitutional?, 94 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1426-27 (2008).
190 Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2006) ("The Secretary,
in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents under this
subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on
the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of
health or functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt
with by such standard for the period of his working life.... In addition to the attainment of
the highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee, other considerations
shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the standards, and
experience gained under this and other health and safety laws." (emphasis added)).
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data. 19 1 Instead, it must make findings of health effects at low exposure levels
in order to justify setting PEL's at such low levels. 192
These burdens, combined with OSHA's limited resources for developing
and evaluating scientific information, have effectively prevented OSHA from
implementing permanent standards for workplace exposures for thousands of
potentially hazardous chemicals. 193 Due at least in part to the heavy burdens on
OSHA to meet the significant risk and feasibility hurdles and defend new
standards against challenges, the pace of new OSHA permanent PEL standards
has been glacial.194 Compounding the problem, even where PEL standards are
in place, OSHA's enforcement of standards is generally viewed as inept. 195
OSHA inspections are relatively rare and fines for infractions are comparatively
miniscule. 196
A more fundamental problem with relying on OSHA command and control
regulations to correct the market failures is that OSHA is not the least-cost
provider of chemical toxicity information, information on the costs of replacing
a chemical, or information on the feasibility of instituting other precautions.197
This information is required to meet the significant risk and feasibility burdens
set by the Court for new standards. 198 OSHA is not in a position to promulgate
standards for the thousands of high volume chemicals in the United States for
191 Indus. Union, 448 U.S. at 659.
192ld; see also MICHAELS, supra note 51, at 32 ("From the start, however, OSHA
recognized that centralized standard setting and top-down enforcement of regulations would
never be sufficient. In a world with thousands of toxic chemicals, the agency could never set
workplace regulations for all of them, nor could it ever have enough inspectors to visit every
workplace on any sort of regular basis.").
19 3 See MICHAELS, supra note 51, at 120 ("Because OSHA has been so beaten down by
the opponents of regulation, it has virtually given up on developing new regulations or
strengthening outdated ones."); see also CRAIG COLLINS, Toxic LOOPHOLES 115 (2010)
("While the [National Toxicology Program] busies itself studying the cancer effects of a few
dozen chemicals, about 1,000 new compounds flood commercial markets. Fully evaluating
the dangers of 1,000 new chemicals every year, especially in combination with the 70,000
already in use, is far beyond the budget of the EPA or any other governmental body.").
194 See, e.g., MICHAELS, supra note 51, at 32 (noting that the Industrial Union decision
"handcuffed the agency because establishing each new standard would now take years and
thousands of staff-hours to produce"); McGarity, supra note 9, at 101 ("[A] consensus is
rapidly emerging that the regulatory regime created by the OSH Act is broken and badly in
need of repair .... During the last twelve years OSHA has promulgated a pitifully small
number of occupational health standards and not a significantly larger number of
occupational safety standards.").
195 Bisom-Rapp, supra note 51, at 1209-11.
196 1d.
197 See generally Richard J. Butler & John D. Worrall, Wage and Injury Response to
Shifts in Workplace Liability, 61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 181, 182 (2008) ("Even where
bargaining is prohibitively expensive, the Coase analysis of liability has implications for
optimal safety outcomes. Efficient safety can be achieved by assigning the liability to the
least-cost avoider.").
198 Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639-42 (1980).
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which no toxicity data is available, let alone the tens of thousands of chemicals
used in lesser quantities. 199 OSHA does not have the resources to design and
conduct animal studies or to explore and study possible naturally occurring
experiments that could provide epidemiological information sufficient to
perform risk assessments or PEL standard feasibility analyses on each of these
chemicals. Asking OSHA to fill the information void with command and
control regulations setting exposure limits is not realistic and does not address
the underlying information deficiency.20 0
D. OSHA Information Communication Standards
Recognizing the difficulties of gathering the data needed to set PELs for
individual chemicals, as well as the potential benefits of requiring the disclosure
of what little information does exist, OSHA in 1983 promulgated the Hazard
Communication Standard.20 1 This standard requires chemical manufacturers to
provide MSDS to their customers for any chemicals posing a "health hazard,"
defined as any chemicals "for which there is statistically significant evidence
based on at least one study conducted in accordance with established scientific
principles that acute or chronic health effects may occur in exposed
employees." 20 2 The Hazard Communication Standard also requires chemical
manufacturers to update their MSDS with any new or significant information
within three months of learning such information.20 3 Employers are then
required to make the MSDS available to their employees. 20 4
If employees were the only ones operating in the dark about chemical
toxicity risks, then regulations requiring employers to disclose such information
would be an appropriate and perhaps sufficient solution. 20 5 Information
19 9 See Lin, supra note 1, at 958-59 ("A 1998 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
study of toxicity data on high production volume (HPV) chemicals those three thousand or
so chemicals imported or produced in the United States in a volume of over one million
pounds per year found no toxicity information publicly available for nearly half of the
chemicals identified. For only a handful of these chemicals-seven percent-was a full set
of basic toxicity information available. While voluntary efforts in the last decade have
sought to collect or generate more information on the potential toxic effects of HPV
chemicals, significant information gaps remain. Toxicity data is even more lacking for the
80,000 or so non-HPV chemicals found in commerce today." (footnotes omitted)).
2001d. at 960 ("The absence of toxicity data hampers these agencies' [including
OSHA's] ability to carry out basic regulatory tasks such as conducting risk assessments,
developing safety guidelines, setting regulatory standards, defending regulations from legal
challenges, and warning the public about potential hazards.").
201 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(a)(1) (2011); see also MICHAELS, supra note 51, at 32 (noting
that the chemical industry pushed OSHA to issue the hazard communication standard in an
effort to avoid the problem of complying with disparate state and local right-to-know laws).
20229 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (2011).
20 31d. § 1910.1200(g)(5).
204 1d. § 1910.1200(g)(8).
20 5 See Lambert, supra note 9, at 1030 32.
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disclosure regulations directing employers to provide safety and risk
information to employees-or as Professor Lambert suggests, to a centralized
information clearinghouse-would be narrowly tailored to the problem while
permitting the market to encourage efficient wage/risk transactions. 20 6
The problem for chemical exposure risks is that the information gap goes
much deeper. As Professor Lambert acknowledges, mandatory information
disclosure regulations cannot prevent market failure where employers
themselves lack information.20 7 If employers do not have adequate information
on the risks of exposures to a given chemical or substance, then requiring them
to provide the information in their possession accomplishes nothing. The
diacetyl story is illustrative. In the 1990s, many MSDSs for diacetyl provided
little information about potential serious respiratory health effects due to
chronic inhalation exposures, despite the existence of the unpublished 1993
BASF study.20 8 At the time, the study conducted by BASF was not available to
other diacetyl manufacturers, microwave popcorn manufacturers, or to the
public.20 9 Even today, years later and after several "popcorn lung" lawsuits,
many current diacetyl MSDSs do not contain adequate information about
potential serious respiratory effects.2 10
Chemical manufacturers are more likely to possess some risk information,
justifying the Hazard Communication Standard's requirement that
manufacturers provide health hazard guidance to employers. If chemical
manufacturers actually conducted adequate toxicity testing on all of their
chemicals and then fully and accurately reported the results on MSDS, then the
Hazard Communication Standard might be effective. In practice, however, the
disincentives to test chemicals and generate information further thwart the goals
of the Hazard Communication Standard. 2 11 The chemical dispersant Corexit
9500, used in the response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, is an excellent
2061d. at 1048-49 (advocating a mandatory disclosure regime requiring the disclosure of
information by the employer to employees, or alternatively to a central clearinghouse for
access by employees, where "the market failure at issue is systematic employee ignorance of
risks and there is no reason to believe that employers are systematically under-informed of
available safety precautions").
207 1d. at 1049.
20 8 See Firmenich incorporated's Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute in Support
of Motion for Summary Judgment on Count Il of Plaintiffs Complaint at paras. 4-5, Blood
v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., No. 07-CV-00142-MWB (N.D. Iowa Apr. 17, 2009) (citing
Exhibit J, a Firmenich MSDS dated Aug. 27, 1999, at 44-45, that provides no information
about any scientific health studies, and indicates that "[t]he identity of individual
components of this mixture is proprietary information and is regarded to be a trade secret,"
that "[v]apor may be irritant to eyes, nose, throat and respiratory tract," and that
"[p]rolonged inhalation at high levels may cause serious health effects"); see also supra note
27 and accompanying text.
2 0 9 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
2 10 OSHA Diacetyl Hazard Communication, supra note 48.
211 See MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 68, at 117, 119.
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example of the ineptitude of the Hazard Communication Standard.2 12 Although
thousands of gallons of Corexit 9500 were used, and employees claimed they
were exposed to the chemical during the response efforts, the MSDS for Corexit
9500 provides only this information on toxicity: "No toxicity studies have been
conducted on this product.' 2 13 Likewise, the MSDS for the suspected diacetyl
substitute 2,3-pentanedione provides: "To the best of our knowledge, the
chemical/physical/toxicological properties have not been thoroughly
investigated." 2 14
The Hazard Communication Standard also contains a loophole, in that it
permits chemical manufacturers to withhold the specific chemical identities for
mixtures or substances if the manufacturer can support a claim that the mixture
or substance is a trade secret. 2 15 in the diacetyl story, the chemical components
of the diacetyl substitutes are not known to the public nor required to be
disclosed on an MSDS because of assertions of trade secret protections.2 16
The Hazard Communication Standard has proven incapable of overcoming
the economic incentives for chemical manufacturers and employers to avoid the
development and dissemination of toxicity information on the chemical
products they sell or use in their workplaces.2 17 Even assuming that sufficient
toxicity data were developed and provided in an MSDS, behavioral economists
have raised legitimate questions about employees' ability to understand and
adequately process this risk-based information. 2 18 If employees cannot
understand the risk information contained in an MSDS, then the labor market
will be unable to set an appropriate compensating wage differential for riskier
jobs. Finally, the Hazard Communication Standard, by itself, does nothing to
address the negative externalities identified in Part III.B. Requiring the
communication of the latest scientific risk information is not the same as
requiring the development of new scientific information. Without new scientific
information, the current burden allocation scheme prevents proper ex post
compensation for injuries due to questions of causation, long latency periods,
and potential contributing factors.
E. OSHA Voluntary Compliance and Cooperative Programs
One final component of the current regulatory regime merits consideration.
Based largely on principles of deregulation and "new governance," and
motivated in part by the difficulty OSHA faces in adopting permanent
standards, OSHA recently began to emphasize voluntary compliance programs.
2 12 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
2 13 See NALCO, supra note 100, at 5 6.2 14 LANSDOWNE AROMATICS, supra note 62, at 2.
2 15 OSHA Hazard Communication, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2011).
2 16 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
217 Frances L. Edwards, Worker Right-to-Know Laws: Ineffectiveness of Current Policy-
Making and a Proposed Legislative Solution, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1, 18 28 (1987).
2 1 8 See id at 19 20.
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A voluntary compliance approach involves the exchange of risk and precaution
information among OSHA, employers, worker advocates, and other
stakeholders, and an effort by OSHA to convince employers to voluntarily
comply with suggested or recommended guidelines based on such
information. 2 19
A voluntary compliance scheme is a particularly poor regulatory fit for
chemical exposure hazards. First, OSHA typically lacks the information
necessary to suggest guidelines for the vast majority of the thousands of
untested chemicals in commerce. Thus, it is not clear what specific
recommendations OSHA can offer. Second, a voluntary compliance program
does nothing to address the negative externalities outlined in Part III.B. If
employers can effectively pass the expected costs of risky chemical exposures
off onto workers, their families, health insurance programs, and social security
programs, then they will have no incentive to take costly precautions to meet
voluntary unenforced guidelines. Without altering the incentives of employers
and chemical manufacturers, voluntary programs will do no good. 220 Employers
and chemical manufacturers will always be motivated by their economic
interests, and if it is in their economic interests to remain ignorant of chemical
risks and externalize costs of illness, they will do so.
The ineffectiveness of voluntary compliance or cooperative programs with
respect to chemical exposures is vividly demonstrated by two examples. First,
consider OSHA's response to the diacetyl concerns raised in Missouri. OSHA
entered into a voluntary partnership agreement with a group of microwave
popcorn manufacturers in 2002.221 The stated goal was for industry and OSHA
to work together to develop a Hazard Information Bulletin that would serve to
transmit risk information to employees. 222 But the agreement failed and no
2 1 9 On voluntary compliance programs and new governance, see generally Bisom-Rapp,
supra note 51; Cynthia Estlund, Something Old, Something New: Governing the Workplace
by Contract Again, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 351 (2007); Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda
for New Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 498 (2004); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal:
The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89
MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Douglas Nejaime, When New Governance Fails, 70 OHIO ST. L.J.
323 (2009).220 See MICHAELS, supra note 51, at 115 16 ("Bluntly put, OSHA has moved from a
regulatory to a collaborative/consultative model. By design, these agreements 'do not
include an enforcement component.' ... It is only a slight exaggeration to say that these
alliances are little more than a way for the agency to look busy." (quoting OSHA Fact Sheet:
OSHA Alliance Program, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., http://www.osha.gov/
OshDoc/data General Facts/factsheet-alliance.pdf (last visited Sep. 28, 2012))). Although
not as pessimistic about cooperative programs as Michaels, Professor Bisom-Rapp
nonetheless acknowledges that "during times of deregulation, the regulatory agencies in
which such innovative [new governance] programs are housed may well be inclined to
render the programming cosmetic rather than substantive." Bisom-Rapp, supra note 51, at
1264.
221 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.222 See Dulberg, supra note 25, at 98.
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Hazard Information Bulletin materialized from the partnership. 223 The
explanation is simple: industry did not have sufficient information about the
risks of diacetyl and had a disincentive to develop that information. Insufficient
information on diacetyl continues to prevent the communication of risk to
employees, and the process of gathering information for the potential
development of a permanent exposure standard for diacetyl has just begun.224 it
should be obvious that voluntary compliance programs do no good where the
main difficulty is insufficient information to develop an agreed-upon standard,
guideline, or suggested voluntary benchmark for employers to meet.
A second example involves a voluntary compliance program developed by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to address the persistent lack of
toxicity testing on chemicals in commerce. In 1998, the EPA entered into a
voluntary initiative called the High Production Volume Challenge Program, in
which some chemical companies agreed to make basic toxicity information for
certain high volume chemicals available to the public by 2004.225 As of 2007,
toxicity data was offered for only about half of the sponsored chemicals.226
Most of the new information consisted only of unpublished prior studies or
different risk and toxicity analyses applied to data that had already been
generated in older studies. 22 7 New testing was done on only a small fraction of
the sponsored chemicals. 228 This lackluster effort by the chemical industry
should not be surprising. The voluntary compliance program did not alter the
economic disincentives for chemical manufacturers to conduct new testing.
As shown by the diacetyl story and the High Production Volume Challenge,
voluntary compliance and cooperative programs do not fundamentally change
economic incentives and therefore hold little promise for solving the workplace
disease problem.
V. PRIOR PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Recognizing the market and regulatory failures, other scholars have offered
a number of proposed solutions rooted in changes to environmental law,
employment law, tort law, or even social security law. These proposals range
from entirely replacing command and control OSHA regulations with more
limited, information-focused optional regulations, 229 to adopting a Superfund-
223 Id.
224 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.22 5 Lin, supra note 1, at 970 71.
2 2 6 See id. at 971.
227 Id.
22 8 See id.
22 9 See Lambert, supra note 9, at 1011-12 (advocating a more limited regulatory
scheme, which would generally replace command and control OSHA regulations with
information disclosure regulations).
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style statute funding independent government research on chemical toxicity,230
to enacting comprehensive federally funded compensation programs using the
social security framework (paid for by risk-based taxes on employers), 231 to
using public nuisance tort law to obtain injunctive relief mandating chemical
testing.232 In recent years, the search for a solution has turned to the possibility
of replicating the European Union's (EU) new system of pre-market registration
and authorization of chemicals, known as the Registration, Evaluation,
Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) program. 233
Although I do not attempt to catalogue and evaluate every proposal
advanced by other writers, below I explore several of the leading proposals and
identify key shortcomings of each. The two most common deficiencies of the
proposals to date are that they: (1) fail to adequately capitalize on the financial
incentives of employers and chemical manufacturers, leaving open the
possibility for continued externalization of the expected costs of exposure; or
(2) fail to adequately compensate employees actually injured by workplace
exposures to hazardous chemicals.
A. The Superfund Modelfor Funding Independent Government Research
An early proposal by Professor Lyndon, loosely modeled after the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), commonly known as Superfund, suggested the creation of a
general fund to sponsor the study of chemical toxicity. 234 The general fund
would be supported by a tax on the petrochemical industry. 235 This "super
study" program would pay for both public and private institutions to conduct
research on toxicity and exposure to chemicals according to a general, national
plan. If this research demonstrates that a chemical is harmful, then custodians of
the fund would be permitted to bring a reimbursement action against the
manufacturers. Liability would be joint and several, with apportionment
according to human exposure rates. 236
The primary strength of this proposal is that it would alleviate concerns
about biased study results stemming from conflicts of interest potentially
created by industry-sponsored research. There are drawbacks, however. One
political drawback is demonstrated by the current Superfund situation. In 1995,
2 3 0 See Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing
Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1836-37 (1989).
231 See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 56-57.
232 See Lin, supra note 1, at 990 91.
233See David E. Adelman, A Cautiously Pessimistic Appraisal of Trends in Toxics
Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 377, 378 (2010) (calling REACH the "brightest light
in the firmament" of toxics regulation).
234 See Lyndon, supra note 230, at 1835-41.
2 3 5 See id at 1836.
2 3 6 See id at 1837.
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Congress refused to renew the special tax that financed the Superfund. 2 37 Since
then, hazardous waste site cleanups have declined, and the cleanup of
"orphaned" sites (where there are no identifiable potentially responsible parties
with assets to pay for the cleanup) are now effectively paid by the general
taxpaying public, not by chemical manufacturers or industry. 2 38 Even assuming
that Professor Lyndon's super study legislation could get off the ground in the
current political climate, it would likely have the same political vulnerabilities
as the Superfund. A later Congress may refuse to renew the tax on the
petrochemical industry, leaving the general taxpaying population to fund
toxicity research while chemical manufacturers and employers continue to
externalize the majority of expected costs of risk from chemical exposures.
Aside from political concerns, some theoretical drawbacks suggest that a
super study program would be misguided. First, the government is not the least-
cost information provider. Manufacturers of chemicals tend to be in the best
position to test them, because they know the most about the chemical structure
of their compounds and they have a better sense of which ones are likely to pose
risks to the environment or to human health. This is reflected in prior instances
where manufacturers had indicators of problems before the public or
government regulators. 239 The chemical industry is best situated to prioritize
chemical compounds for study. The super-study, government-led research
would therefore be more difficult and more costly than industry-directed
research.240
Finally, it is not clear how the super study program would affect the
compensation goal of the worker safety regime, if at all. Under Professor
Lyndon's proposal, the general fund supporting the studies would be
replenished by reimbursement actions against the manufacturers of chemicals
found to be harmful after testing.24 1 But the reimbursement payments to the
fund would do nothing to compensate workers who had previously been
exposed to the chemicals in question, but were not able to recover for their
illnesses for years (or possibly never, if the applicable workers' compensation
limitations period would bar their claims). 242 If the level of combined ex ante
and ex post compensation for risky behavior does not rise to cover all the true
costs of such behavior, then the proposed reform will fail to achieve an efficient
allocation of risk and precaution. The super study would, at best, provide an
incremental adjustment to the risk/precaution behavior of chemical
manufacturers and employers.
2 3 7 See John M. Broder, Without Superfund Tax, Stimulus Aids Cleanups, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 2009, at 16.
23 8 See id.
23 9 See, e.g., supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing the early BASF
animal study of diacetyl).
240 See Lin, supra note 1, at 997.
241 See Lyndon, supra note 230, at 1835 41.
242 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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B. Opt-Out OSHA Standards
Professor Lambert contends that where information deficiencies are facing
not just employees, but also employers, the best regulatory fit is an opt-out
OSHA standard. 243 Professor Lambert offers ergonomic standards as one
example of situations in which an employer may have difficulty generating or
evaluating information about safety risks and available precautions and their
costs. Under Professor Lambert's approach, OSHA would adopt an optional
standard and provide employers with information about safety risks. Employers
would be obligated to meet the standard unless they opted-out by providing
safety risk information to employees and explaining to employees the reasons
why following the standard would be inappropriate or uneconomical for that
particular employer. 244 Opt-out regulations, according to Professor Lambert, are
narrowly suited to resolving informational market failures while still permitting
gains from trade in cases where compliance with a standard would prove more
costly than paying wage differentials (combined with expected ex post
compensation) to risk-preferring employees.24 5
Opt-out regulations may hold at least some promise where information
problems are facing employees and employers, but not regulators. OSHA may
be in a position to cheaply research or collect risk information and develop opt-
out standards for workplace risks such as ergonomics, where researching cost-
effective precautionary measures may not be as expensive as chemical toxicity
testing and where assertions of trade secrets are unlikely to block study.246 But
for chemical exposures, where severe information obstacles are facing not just
employees and employers, but also the regulators themselves, opt-out
regulations will not cure the market failures.
243 Lambert, supra note 9, at 1070 ("An opt-out regulation would specify a particular
cost-effective precaution an employer must take unless she opts out of complying with the
rule by notifying her current and prospective employees of (1) the hazard the precaution
would address, (2) the nature of the precaution at issue and the fact that the government has
recommended it, and (3) the fact that she is opting out of compliance with the rule."). One
potential difficulty with this approach, in general, is that current employees may not be in a
position to negotiate an adequate compensating wage differential when an employer opts
out, because of the investments that current employees have made in selecting this job. Such
investments may include, for example, foregoing other employment offers that are now
expired, and relocating family. See Lyndon, supra note 230, at 1834 ("Workers are
particularly vulnerable with respect to occupational health risks. Geographic and economic
factors limit their discretion to choose among risks."). Older employees may also have
difficulty finding new alternative employment if they are unsatisfied with the employer's
offered wage differential. See generally Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice:
Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8 (1993).
244 See Lambert, supra note 9, at 1070-71.
24 5 See id. at 1049-50.
2 4 6 See id at 1068 (providing as an example OSHA's voluntary ergonomics guidelines
for the meat-packing industry, which amount to advice to the industry regarding potential
cost-saving precautionary measures).
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Initially, for reasons discussed above, employees will be unlikely to
correctly process any chemical risk information the employer provides and, in
any event, unable to negotiate wage premiums due to job investments and lack
of bargaining power.24 7 Employers and chemical manufacturers would have the
same disincentives to test chemicals and generate information. Even more
problematic, OSHA would be unable to promulgate the opt-out standards in the
first instance, given that it lacks the resources necessary to conduct toxicity
testing on the thousands of untested chemicals in the marketplace. And for those
chemicals that are left untested, and therefore without a governing opt-out
regulation, the risk/precaution incentives and the compensatory schemes would
essentially be the same as the status quo. Asking OSHA to develop even opt-out
regulations, without altering the incentives for the least-cost information
generators-employers and chemical manufacturers-will not close the
information gap.
Opt-out regulations would fail in the context of chemical exposures for yet
another reason-the negative externalities outlined in Part III.B. Professor
Lambert's proposal assumes that most employers will want to meet the
suggested optional regulations because they are cost-effective and reduce the
amount of ex post compensation an employer will be required to pay for on-the-
job injuries. 248 But unique characteristics of illnesses caused by chemical
exposures, including long latency periods, toxicity uncertainty, and potential
confounding factors allow employers to shift costs onto employees, insurers,
and taxpayers. Employers and manufacturers never bear the full expected costs
of the exposure risk, making opt-out regulations ineffective.
C. Combining Social Insurance Programs and Risk-Based Taxes
A number of other scholars have focused on reforming the compensatory
system to achieve more efficient levels of risk and precaution. Professor Viscusi
has proposed compensating all worker diseases, regardless of cause, from social
security programs, while funding the programs with special risk-based taxes on
employers. 24 9 Similarly, Professor Frances Edwards advanced a proposal that
the federal government create a special fund to compensate all victims of latent
occupational disease, with funding coming from a payroll tax.250 The amount of
payroll tax would be adjusted by NIOSH to impose higher taxes on those
24 7 See supra notes 217-18, 243 and accompanying text.
24 8 See Lambert, supra note 9, at 1071 ("If the substantive requirements of an opt-out
regulation were truly cost-effective... then employers would tend to adopt them
voluntarily that is, they would choose not to opt out. Employers who could not cheaply
comply and for whom the expected savings in injury costs were less than the costs of
compliance, however, would not be forced to adopt an inefficient precaution as long as they
provided the information that would ensure that they ended up paying (in the form of risk
premiums) the full costs of risks they impose.").
24 9 See Viscusi, supra note 4, at 77.
250 See Edwards, supra note 217, at 42-43.
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employers whose operations create more risk to employee health than ordinary
business operations. 2 51
These proposals would be effective in spreading the expected costs of latent
worker disease broadly amongst the population, but they would not likely close
the toxicity information gap. Social security type programs will be unlikely to
fundamentally change the incentives of employers and chemical manufacturers.
Because of imperfections in the ability of NIOSH (or other regulatory bodies) to
accurately set risk-based taxes-especially in the absence of new toxicology
studies-most employers will likely be content to pay the imposed tax, rather
than make costly expenditures on new research on their substances. Further, the
Viscusi and Edwards proposals may actually exacerbate the negative
externalities from which employers now benefit. If the risk-based taxes are
inaccurately set, due to poor estimates of the expected costs imposed by any
particular employer, then employers will not bear an appropriate portion of the
ex post compensation for an employee who contracts an occupational disease.
The employee's relief would come from a general fund, not from an insurance
policy held by the specific employer in question, with corresponding premiums
that may adjust according to an employer's particular experience rating. Nor
will employers be likely to pay any significant ex ante wage premium for risky
jobs, since-assuming the compensation system is sufficient-employees will
know that a federal social security program will compensate them for any latent
diseases. In these ways, a general compensation fund for occupational diseases
may actually exacerbate the incentive for employers to use untested chemicals
and the disincentive for employers to help develop new toxicity information.
Finally, it is not clear how these programs would include chemical
manufacturers, the true least cost risk avoiders and least cost information
generators, in the general compensation scheme. If chemical manufacturers are
included in the system only in their capacity as employers, and not in their dual
capacities as employers and producers of potentially harmful chemical
products, then they will bear an insufficient amount of the cost of ex post
compensation of disease victims (in the form of their share of risk-based taxes
on employers). Risk-based taxes on chemical manufacturers calculated only by
looking at the risk that such manufacturers impose on their own employees
ignores a large part of the negative externality that manufacturers exploit
through the toxicity uncertainty of their chemicals. Chemical manufacturers
impose some of the expected costs of their products on employees who work
with their products in the manufacture of other goods further down the
production chain. In order to properly incentivize chemical manufacturers, they
must bear a much larger share of the ex post compensation for disease than they
do under the current regime.
While the proposals advanced by Viscusi and Edwards would make strides
toward accomplishing the compensatory goal of the worker safety regime, they
2 5 1 Id. at 42.
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do not appear well-suited to accomplishing the first goal-achieving an
efficient level of risk and precaution.
D. Public Nuisance Actions Requiring Testing
Recently, Professor Albert Lin has suggested a new and intriguing approach
to chemical testing-using public nuisance tort claims to require chemical
manufacturers to test their products. 252 Although Professor Lin's proposal is
focused on the problem of insufficient chemical testing in general, and not
specifically on workplace exposures, his proposal would nonetheless influence
the worker disease regime. Under Professor Lin's proposal, states could bring
civil public nuisance claims against chemical manufacturers seeking only
injunctive relief.253 The injunctions sought would require testing on a given
chemical before it may be sold or distributed within the state. 254
The public nuisance proposal has the advantage of requiring no change in
the law, other than perhaps a more expansive view of the reach of public
nuisance tort claims than might currently be accepted by some courts.2 55 it also
has the benefit of not imposing a crushing litigation burden on chemical
manufacturers, since only public entities would be able to bring these failure-to-
test claims, and the claims could be selectively chosen given the limited
resources of the state attorneys general. 256 But this admitted advantage may also
be the biggest shortcoming of the proposal. There is no reason to expect state
attorneys general to devote significant resources to identifying which of
thousands of chemicals should be the subject of a failure-to-test suit. Moreover,
the long latency period of diseases caused by exposures means that the public
may not consider the pursuit of such claims a high priority, leaving little
political pressure on attorneys general to pursue them.
More importantly, these public nuisance suits would not alter the incentives
of employers and manufacturers, and would not ensure the adequate
compensation of victims. The injunctions, if awarded, might lead to compliance
and new testing as to any specific, identified chemicals. But in the absence of a
fine or some other type of penalty, there would be little or no deterrent effect.
Chemical manufacturers would have the same disincentives to generate toxicity
information and would comply with a testing injunction only when an attorney
general singles out one of their chemicals. Otherwise, it would be business as
usual for chemical manufacturers. Nor would the public nuisance suits cure the
ex post compensation problem. New testing on certain selectively chosen
chemicals would do nothing to compensate employees already suffering from
2 5 2 See Lin, supra note 1, at 958.
25 3 1d. at 990 91.
254 See id.
25 5 See id. at 986-87.
2 5 6 See id. at 999 ("Public nuisance actions not only can target individual chemicals for
testing, but their case-specific approach also allows testing requirements to be tailored to fit
specific situations.").
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diseases caused by exposure to substances that did not catch the attention of the
attorneys general.
E. Amending the OSHAct to Categorize Hazards and Shift Burdens for
High-Risk Hazard Categories
Professor Shapiro and Professor McGarity have proposed a type of burden
shifting that focuses on OSHA standards rather than on the proof of
causation. 257 Under their proposal, OSHA would create categories of industrial
hazards.258 Any industry in which workers are exposed to chemicals that OSHA
has identified as those that "could reasonably be anticipated to cause a material
impairment of health or functional capacity" would initially be categorized as
Class Ii industries. 259 Those industries would be required to install "best
available workplace risk reduction technology" (BAT) by specified
deadlines. 260 If the BAT requirement and regulation under Class ii were
deemed insufficient by OSHA, it could redesignate the industrial hazard to
Class 1.261 This would require employers to reduce exposure to the extent
"feasible," which would impose a more significant and expensive burden on
employers than a BAT requirement. 262 OSHA could also identify certain high-
risk operations within Class I and require permitting for those industries. 263
Under the plan suggested by Professor McGarity, regulated employers or
trade associations could petition OSHA to "redesignate an industry to the least
stringently regulated Class III upon a demonstration that employees in the
industry could not reasonably be anticipated to suffer 'material impairment of
health or functional capacity' under any realistic exposure scenarios." 264 With
this option, industry would "bear the burden of demonstrating that employee
exposure to the listed substance was so trivial as to reduce the risk of harm to
acceptable levels." 265
This plan has the definite advantage of relieving OSHA of at least some of
the burden of defending its standards under the significant risk and feasibility
tests.266 But it falls short of providing a comprehensive solution to the worker
disease problem. First, this plan begins from the assumption that OSHA can
accurately identify a list of chemicals that may pose health hazards, from which
257 See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Reorienting OSHA:
Regulatory Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1989). See also
McGarity, supra note 9, at 107.
258 Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 257, at 47.
259Id
2601Id.
261 Id.
262 See id. at 47-48.
263 See McGarity, supra note 9, at 108.
264 d at 108.
2 6 5 1d
"
266 See supra notes 189 90, 194 and accompanying text.
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OSHA can begin the categorization. Whether OSHA has the resources,
information, and expertise to accomplish this is questionable. Consider whether
diacetyl would have made such a list as of the mid-1990s, when BASF had
unpublished information on the dangers of diacetyl inhalation, but the FDA had
declared diacetyl "generally recognized as safe." '267
Second, this plan would not change the compensatory system, and therefore
would not cure the market's inability to efficiently set risk and precaution
levels. Although the plan would facilitate the process of promulgating OSHA
command and control regulations, and might incentivize the production of new
scientific information regarding toxicity, it would not change the ex post
compensation scheme under state workers' compensation laws. Victims of
occupational disease would remain undercompensated, and employers and
manufacturers would continue to externalize a significant chunk of the expected
costs of diseases caused by worker exposures.
Third, this proposal does not appear to directly involve chemical
manufacturers and suppliers in the compensation process. Although
manufacturers of a particular chemical may wish to assist certain industries in
achieving a Class III designation, their incentive will likely be only indirect,
through the demand for their chemical product used in a manufacturing process
further down the production chain. This could be an insufficient financial
incentive to spur chemical manufacturers-those in the best position to generate
information-to develop new toxicity information. As explained above, many
manufacturers (such as the microwave popcorn manufacturers) lack information
about the exposure risks posed by-and sometimes even the chemical identities
of-the substances they use in their manufacturing process. 268 Such employers
would be unable to meet the burden proposed by Professors McGarity and
Shapiro without assistance from chemical manufacturers. Without sufficient
financial incentives, chemical manufacturers will not likely be willing to
conduct new testing to help employers meet this burden.
Professor McGarity states: "Although [this] proposal is certainly not the
only possible burden shifting device, some kind of procedural vehicle to shift
the burden of justification is necessary if OSHA is to have any hope of
accelerating the ponderous pace of its standard-setting efforts." 269 With this
statement, I concur. But I would submit that a more comprehensive and
fundamental change in the workplace disease regime requires addressing not
just OSHA's command and control standards, but also the workers'
compensation system. The inclusion of chemical manufacturers in the
compensation system is necessary to provide more effective incentives for
chemical manufacturers to join OSHA's efforts and push for new exposure
standards.
26721 C.F.R. § 184.1278 (1983); see also supra notes 25, 27-28 and accompanying text.
26 8 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
26 9 McGarity, supra note 9, at 109.
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F. The REACH Model
Finally, the United States could follow the model of the EU's chemical
registration legislation, known as REACH, which became effective in EU
member nations in June 2007.270 REACH generally adopts a precautionary
approach to the introduction of chemicals into the marketplace. Instead of
presuming that all industrial chemicals are innocent until proven guilty,
REACH requires that chemical manufacturers prove the safety of at least some
chemicals before they can market them.271
Regulation under REACH is tiered, based in part on the volume of the
chemical produced. 272 REACH provides for the registration of all chemicals
produced or used in quantities exceeding one ton per year.273 Registration
involves the submission of a dossier on the chemical listing any relevant health
hazard information. 274 The amount and type of information required varies with
the type and volume of the chemical, as well as the previously known safety
concerns relating to the chemical. 275 A failure to register results in a ban on the
manufacture or import of the chemical. 276
Reaction to REACH by chemical manufacturers in the U.S. market has
been predictably negative. 277 Currently, the passage of legislation like REACH
in the United States seems politically unlikely. My more moderate proposal
would not mandate that the industry perform new research on all high volume
chemicals, but instead would provide financial incentives to spur such research.
A proposal that is based on correctly aligning the financial incentives of the
relevant parties, so that economic externalities are internalized by the market
participants, may be more likely to succeed in the United States than a proposal
for increased direct regulation.
Aside from practical political considerations, there are other problems with
REACH. Providing a tiered structure and limiting registration to relatively high
volume chemicals may miss chemicals with harmful health effects. 278 Further,
the REACH model envisions that regulators would review for reliability only a
small portion of the data submitted, and regulators would be required to sort out
270 See Leslie E. Kersey, Note, Trans-Atlantic REACH: The Potential Impact of the
European Union's New Chemical Regulations on Proof of Causation in US. Federal
Courts, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 535, 537 39 (2009) (contending that the EU's REACH
requirements may have some limited impact on proof of causation in toxic tort claims in the
United States); see also COLLINS, supra note 193, at 123 24.
27 1 See COLLINS, supra note 193, at 123.
272 See Adelman, supra note 233, at 392.
273 See Kersey, supra note 270, at 542.
274 Id.
27 51d.
276 Id
277/ /.at 538-39.
27 8 See COLLINS, supra note 193, at 123 n.32 (noting that Greenpeace and others have
criticized as too limited the scope of chemicals covered under the first REACH list of
covered chemicals).
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which chemicals to prioritize. Chemical manufacturers would continue to have
an incentive to submit minimal data, or mere plans for testing rather than
results, in hopes that the majority of their chemicals will fall through the quality
control cracks of REACH. Indeed, REACH contains exceptions for certain
chemicals, manufacturers, and importers, to provide that only study proposals
or protocols are needed to secure registration and allow marketing of the
chemical. 27 9
Further, unlike REACH, my proposal will leave chemical manufacturers
with a choice about conducting additional, expensive studies: if they anticipate
that a particular chemical is likely to be harmful or likely to draw a number of
workers' compensation claims, they can attempt to establish an OSHA PEL and
develop the data supporting the PEL. If, on the other hand, existing studies or
the chemical's structure convince the manufacturers that the chemical is likely
to be benign, then the manufacturers can choose not to push for an OSHA PEL
and save the expense of conducting additional toxicity studies. Notably, the
chemical manufacturers are precisely the entities in the best position to make
that cost-benefit evaluation; they know the most about the structure and
potential dangers of the chemical. REACH does not permit this type of cost-
benefit evaluation by the manufacturers.28 0 instead, it simply requires
compliance with the governmentally imposed registration regulations, and
leaves to government regulators all decisions about which chemicals must be
registered. 28 1
Finally, the REACH model, like Professor Lyndon's super study proposal,
will likely fail to adequately change risk/precaution allocations and thereby fail
to satisfy the compensation goal of the workplace safety regime. Chemical
manufacturers and employers using chemicals regulated under a registration
system will submit the minimum information necessary to secure registration of
their chemicals. That information may help some claimants establish causation
in workers' compensation (or tort) at the margins, but it will not likely bring ex
post compensation up to the levels necessary to force chemical manufacturers
and employers to internalize the full expected costs of the chemicals they use.
2 7 9 Kersey, supra note 270, at 561.280 See generally Regulation 1907/2006, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 18 December 2006 Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), Establishing a European Chemicals Agency, Amending
Directive 199/45/EC and Repealing Council Regulation (EEC) 793/93 and Commission
Regulation (EC) 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC and Commission
Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EED, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 396) 1 (EC).
28 1 See Noah M. Sachs, Jumping the Pond. Transnational Law and the Future of
Chemical Regulation, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1817, 1834-38, 1842-44 (2009) (describing
REACH registration requirements and some costs of implementation).
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VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION: GETTING EMPLOYERS AND CHEMICAL
MANUFACTURERS TO PUSH FOR NEW EXPOSURE STANDARDS
A. Proposal Goals and Features
The key to reviving the current three-pronged worker disease regime is to
recognize and address the sources of market and regulatory failure. Any
proposal should have, as its primary goal, capitalizing on the financial
incentives facing the least-cost information providers and least-cost risk
avoiders. 28 2 in this Part, I detail my proposal for accomplishing that goal. My
proposal contains two main features: (1) a default burden allocation framework
on the issue of disease causation, and (2) expansion of workers' compensation
proceedings to include chemical manufacturers.
1. Proposal Feature 1: A Default Burden Allocation Framework
The key component of my proposed reform is establishing a default burden
allocation rule on the question of causation in employees' claims for ex post
compensation for workplace disease. This default burden allocation would
provide that if a claimant can present some minimal, prima facie evidence of
causation, then the burden of disproving causation will be on the employer. The
prima facie evidence may consist of a single animal or epidemiological study, a
study regarding the chemical's pharmacokinetic properties, or an expert opinion
regarding the "biological plausib[ility]" 283 of causation based on analysis of
chemical structure, pharmacokinetic mechanisms, or comparison to other
chemicals or compounds whose health effects have been studied. To meet her
prima facie burden, the claimant would also need to produce some evidence
tending to show that she was exposed to the chemical or substance while
working for the employer. In practice, the claimant's prima facie case would be
similar to, and perhaps even more demanding than, the preliminary link
showing required for shifting the burden of production under Alaska's workers'
compensation law.2 84
282 Others have described and advocated analogous regulatory default rules in the
context of environmental law. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing
Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 869 (2006) ("Regulatory penalty
default rules may also be information-forcing in the additional sense that they induce
regulated parties to produce new information that may be required to construct the proposed
alternative and secure its approval. This feature is likely to be especially useful when the
regulated party does not presently hold the desired information but is the party best situated
to produce it a common occurrence in environmental regulation." (second emphasis
added)).
2 8 3 See U.S. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 201
(1994).
284 See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text. For example, the Alaska Supreme
Court found that one physician's testimony that he believed the claimant's disease to be
"secondary to airborne chemical burn.., perpetuated by continued exposure to sulfur
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Claimant's prima facie evidence would be required to meet the standards
for admissibility and consideration of expert testimony in workers'
compensation proceedings in the jurisdiction, which is typically relaxed from
the common law or statutory rules of evidence. 28 5 No rule of admissibility,
however, should operate to exclude proffered evidence simply because it is
based on animal studies. The use of animal studies as evidence of causation in
legal proceedings is controversial. 2 86 However, as the diacetyl case
demonstrates, animal studies like the BASF study can be early indicators of
potential toxicity and of the need to develop further information.28 7 Moreover,
human epidemiological studies are often unavailable for newer compounds and
human experimental trials are obviously unethical outside the arena of
experimental drug testing. If the policy goal of the proposed liability regime is
to spur chemical manufacturers and employers to conduct the testing necessary
to close the information gap and set an appropriate OSHA exposure limit
standard-especially for new chemicals-then animal studies must be
considered sufficient to establish a prima facie case in workplace disease law. 288
If claimant meets her prima facie burden, then the burdens of production
and persuasion on the element of causation would be shifted to the employer. 28 9
The employer can disprove causation by coming forward with sufficient
evidence to convince the trier of fact, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
dioxide and chlorine" was sufficient to shift the burden of production. La. Pac. Corp. v.
Koons, 816 P.2d 1379, 1381 (Alaska 1991) (alteration in original); see also supra note 171
and accompanying text.28 5 See, e.g., N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 118 (McKinney 2005) (in making
investigation or conducting a hearing the chairman or board is "not ... bound by common
law or statutory rules of evidence"); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145-47
(1997) (affirming the exclusion of expert evidence including human epidemiological studies
and animal studies); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 93 (1993)
(requiring courts considering the admissibility of scientific expert testimony to make "a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied
to the facts in issue").
286 See Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Light for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of
Science and Intellectual Due Process, 33 GA. L. REV. 1047, 1079 80 (1999); Neal C. Stout
& Peter A. Valberg, Bayes' Law, Sequential Uncertainties, and Evidence of Causation in
Toxic Tort Cases, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 781, 816 17 (2005); Amanda Hungerford, Note,
Back to Basics: Courts' Treatment of Agency Animal Studies After Daubert, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 70, 70 (2010).
28 7 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
28 8 See generally MICHAELS, supra note 51, at 25 ("Animal studies are important, but
manufacturers often hold out for epidemiological evidence with humans before accepting
any label that a substance is a carcinogen. Alternatively, they will hold out for animal studies
if the only existing evidence comes from epidemiologic studies.").
289A shift in the burden of persuasion distinguishes this proposal from the current
workers' compensation laws in Alaska and the District of Columbia. See supra notes 169-
70, 173 and accompanying text.
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exposure to the chemical in question did not cause the claimant's disease or
illness. 290
This burden allocation framework is loosely patterned after the type of
burden-shifting frequently used in employment discrimination cases.2 91 The
justifications for burden-shifting on the question of causation in occupational
disease cases are similar to those at work in discrimination cases: judicial
estimates of the information costs facing each litigant on the element in
question (here, disease causation; in employment cases, discriminatory motive),
combined with judicial estimates of probabilities on the merits of the element in
question, after taking into account the evidence constituting the prima facie
case, can justify shifting the burden of proof onto the defendant. 292
Evidence on the element of causation is generally elusive in the context of
chemical exposures and is more likely to be in the possession or control of the
employer than the employee. As between the employee and the employer, the
employer is the lesser-cost risk avoider and the lesser-cost information
generator on chemical exposures. Additionally, the required prima facie
showing forces the claimant to show, at least minimally, some probability that
exposure to the chemical caused the ailment. The relative information costs
facing the parties, combined with a prima facie showing on the probability of
causation, is sufficient to justify altering the usual allocation of the burdens of
proof.2 93
Employers would not be locked into this burden-shifting framework,
however. To encourage the production of toxicity information, my proposal
would offer employers a way out of bearing the burden of proof on causation:
enforceable OSHA standards. If a permanent OSHA PEL standard is in place
for the chemical, then the foregoing burden-shifting framework would not
apply. Rather, the burden of proof on causation would remain on the claimant.
290 In the context of reproductive and genetic workplace hazards, Professor Jean
Macchiaroli Eggen proposed a similar burden-shifting scheme, although without a safe
harbor provision to trigger information production by employers, and without an expansion
of workers' compensation coverage to reach product manufacturers. See Jean Macchiaroli
Eggen, Toxic Reproductive and Genetic Hazards in the Workplace: Challenging the Myths
of the Tort and Workers' Compensation Systems, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 899-905
(1992).
291 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 267 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat.
1074, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 360-61 (1977); McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 03 (1973).
292 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 267 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[O]ur decisions in
Teamsters and Franks do indicate a recognition that presumptions shifting the burden of
persuasion based on evidentiary probabilities and the policies behind the statute are not alien
to our Title VII jurisprudence.").
293 1d; see also FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., & JOHN LEUBSDORF,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.16 (5th ed. 2001); EDWARD W. MCCLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE §§ 337, 343 (2d ed. 1972); 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2486 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1981).
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For chemicals or substances specifically governed by an OSHA permanent
standard, the claimant would bear the burden of proving either: (1) by a
preponderance of the evidence, that she was exposed at levels exceeding the
PEL; or (2) by clear and convincing evidence, that her disease was caused by
exposure to the substance, even though she was exposed at or below the PEL. 294
Using a default burden allocation framework will provide employers with
an economic incentive to push for the adoption of permanent OSHA regulations
setting PELs that employers can realistically meet. To do so, employers will
have an incentive to ensure that OSHA obtains sufficient information to satisfy
the significant risk and feasibility requirements of the OSH Act, as interpreted
by the Supreme Court. This includes developing and presenting to OSHA
evidence on both the toxicity of a substance and the feasibility of meeting
various possible PELs for the substance. In other words, employers will have an
incentive to provide information on both the risks of exposure and the costs of
taking precautions. 295 By changing the incentives to produce information, this
approach would specifically target the first area of market failure-information
deficiency. 2 96
294 On the second point, states might be encouraged to make an election on the standard
of proof. That is, some states might prefer to enact a statute providing that if there is a
governing OSHA PEL, the claimant may nonetheless prevail by proving by a preponderance
standard that her disease was caused by exposure to the substance, even though she was
exposed at or below the PEL. States taking this approach would reduce the overall incentive
for employers and chemical manufacturers to seek PELs. On the other hand, a clear and
convincing standard may result in an excessive number of meritorious claims being denied.
Striking the right balance on the standard of proof in this situation could be left to state
legislatures, and the resulting empirical evidence could later be compared across
jurisdictions.
295 One lingering concern is outdated PELs based on old scientific information. Due to
information problems and the requirements imposed on OSHA by the courts, most of the
current permanent PELs are based on scientific information from the 1960s. Kyle W.
Morrisson, Reaching the Limit on PELs: Calls Increase for OSHA to Update Decades-Old
Regulation, NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL, http://www.nsc.org/safetyhealth/Pages/51OPELs.aspx
(last visited Nov. 8, 2012); see also McGarity, supra note 9, at 101. As a result, employers
might be able to take advantage of the proposed safe harbor provision on the basis of an
outdated and inadequate PEL. This concern can be addressed in a manner consistent with my
proposal in one of two ways: (1) amend the OSH Act to include a sunset provision for
permanent PELs, so that they must be regularly reviewed and updated on the basis of new
scientific information; or (2) encourage states to include in their workers' compensation
amendments a condition that the applicable OSHA standard must have been adopted,
updated, or reviewed by OSHA within a set period of time prior to the alleged exposures. If
the OSH Act is not amended to provide a uniform national updating requirement, then states
adopting my proposal could be encouraged to experiment with different approaches to the
problem of outdated PELs.
296This type of default burden allocation is similar to the types of "penalty default
rules" that have been advocated in other contexts by professors Ian Ayres and Robert
Gertner. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner,
Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591, 1591 (1999); see also
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This approach would also reduce the employer's ability to impose negative
externalities. Where OSHA does not have sufficient new information to
promulgate a governing PEL, causation remains murky, and latency periods
prevent the identification of causal factors, the employer will bear the burden of
disproving causation. Conversely, where OSHA obtains sufficient information
to identify and enforce a PEL, the effects of latency and scientific uncertainty
will be reduced by the new information. Employers will be forced to internalize
more of the expected costs of the risks they impose through the use of
hazardous chemicals in the workplace, because the ex post compensation
system will benefit from the new information.
2. Proposal Feature 2: Expanding Worker Disease Statutes to Cover
Chemical Manufacturers
The burden-shifting framework outlined above will do little good if
employers are not in a position to cost-effectively develop and produce to
OSHA new scientific information about toxicity and precaution costs.
Employers, like employees, may face insurmountable information generation
costs. Removing the economic disincentive to provide information may not be
sufficient. Many, if not most, employers will not be in a position to cost-
effectively conduct or sponsor animal or epidemiological studies on every
chemical compound or substance they use in their manufacturing process. Even
where some employers have such resources, they may be inclined to free ride
off of other employers if they know that the other employers use the same
chemicals and will likely develop the information necessary to support an
OSHA standard. Among employers using the chemical, the toxicity and
feasibility information will be a public good. All employers using the chemical
will get the benefit of an OSHA standard regardless of which employer actually
spends the resources to develop and produce the information necessary to
support the standard.
One cause of this problem is that the current worker safety regime does not
effectively incorporate the true least-cost risk avoiders, the true least-cost
information generators, and those who have the most direct economic interests
in the regulation of chemicals-the chemical manufacturers themselves. 297
Karkkainen, supra note 282, at 865 66 (drawing upon the "penalty default" model and
advocating, in the environmental context, regulatory default rules that impose "harsh
background regulatory requirements coupled with an opportunity for regulated parties to
'bargain around' the default baseline by securing regulatory approval for alternative
arrangements"); Wagner, Commons Ignorance, supra note 17, at 1741.
297Most current state workers' compensations laws provide that an employer (or its
insurer) that pays workers' compensation benefits to an employee-claimant is subrogated to
the employee's tort claim against a third party, and that the employer may pursue a claim
against the third party if the employee chooses not to do so. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 440.39 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-36 (West Supp. 2012); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 342.700 (LexisNexis 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061 (West 2012); Mo. ANN.
2012]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Chemical manufacturers have the most at stake in any direct regulation of a
particular chemical. If the worker safety regulatory regime does not include
chemical manufacturers in some meaningful way, then they will remain free to
exploit the market failures attendant to the risks their chemical products impose.
The first feature of my proposal will put some incremental increased economic
pressure on chemical manufacturers to produce more information. If some
employers cease, or threaten to cease, using a chemical for which OSHA has no
standard in order to avoid the burden shift, then chemical manufacturers may
feel pressure to pursue a PEL for that chemical. But more direct and significant
economic pressure could be applied to chemical manufacturers if they were
directly incorporated into the governing liability scheme.
Thus, the second feature of my proposal is to expand the reach of workers'
compensation laws to include chemical manufacturers and suppliers. Employers
responding to workers' compensation claims would be permitted to name as
third-party respondents in the workers' compensation proceeding any chemical
manufacturer that supplied the employer with any quantity of the chemical that
the claimant alleges caused her disease. Importantly, the burden of proof
framework described above as the first feature of my proposal would be equally
applicable to this third-party type claim. Where, in the absence of an OSHA
regulation, an employee-claimant makes the required prima facie showing, the
burden would be on the employer to disprove causation. However, the employer
would be able to impose any resulting liability on the third-party respondent
chemical manufacturer under the same proof scheme. As a result, where there is
no OSHA regulation the employer will still be able to avoid paying ex post
compensation claims to the employee (or increased premiums as a result of
adverse experience ratings) if it names the supplying chemical manufacturer as
third-party respondent and the chemical manufacturer is unable to satisfy the
burden of disproving causation. A chemical manufacturer would have a defense
against the employer if it can affirmatively establish that the employer used the
STAT. § 287.150 (West Supp. 2012); N.Y. WORKERS' CoMP. LAW § 227 (McKinney 2005);
OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 348 (West 2012); 77 PA. CONS. STAY. ANN. § 1419 (West 2002);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-112 (2008); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 417.001 (West 2012); VA.
CODE ANN. § 65.2-309 (2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2A-1 (LexisNexis 2010); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 102.29 (West 2011); see also Andrew R. Klein, Apportionment of Liability in
Workplace Injury Cases, 26 BERKELEY. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 65, 67 n.7 (2005) (noting that
most states still permit employers to recover the full cost of any paid workers' compensation
benefit from a third-party tortfeasor). Under these laws, however, the employee or the
subrogated employer or insurer will only prevail against a third-party chemical manufacturer
if it can establish liability under the state's tort laws. For the reasons discussed more fully
supra Part IV.B, tort theories, including defective product or failure to warn theories, are
generally ill-suited to chemical exposure claims and are insufficient to prevent chemical
manufacturers from externalizing much of the expected costs of their products.
Internalization of those expected costs requires that chemical manufacturers be subjected to
the proof standards I have proposed for workers' compensation claims. Exposing chemical
manufacturers to the shifting proof standards set forth above would force manufacturers to
internalize a more substantial share of the expected costs of their products.
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chemical in a manner contrary to the recommendations of the MSDS, or that the
employer failed to take precautions recommended by the MSDS.
Adding chemical manufacturers directly into the ex post compensation
scheme is crucial, because it ensures the involvement of the least-cost risk
avoider and the least-cost generator of chemical toxicity information. It will
directly incentivize chemical manufacturers to generate and produce toxicity
and feasibility information (rather than indirectly incentivize them through the
market demand for its chemicals). Chemical manufacturers will no doubt
contend that this proposal would subject them to crippling liability for employee
illnesses and impossibly heavy burdens to produce scientific information on
their products. It will certainly shift a greater share of the costs of scientific
uncertainty onto chemical manufacturers. But this argument ignores the benefits
that have been inefficiently and unjustly enjoyed by the chemical manufacturers
to this point. The "innocent until proven dangerous" approach to chemical
regulation has permitted chemical manufacturers to profit from uncertainty and
negative externalities for decades. A negative impact on chemical
manufacturers is not a reason to reject the proposal; rather, it is the natural and
expected result of a proposed reform that forces the internalization of expected
costs of exposure risks.
Further, chemical manufacturers will be able to spread the costs of this risk
the same way that employers do now, through the purchase of workers'
compensation insurance policies. The price of insurance will likely be passed
through, to some extent, in the form of increased chemical prices. But this will
simply ensure that the full expected costs of chemicals are borne by the
employers that use potentially risky chemicals and the purchasers of products
that require the use of such chemicals in the manufacturing process. The market
will be able to arrive at efficient levels of risk and precaution: the expected
costs of risky chemicals will be re-introduced into the price for those chemicals
and, in turn, the price of goods manufactured with these chemicals. The price of
the end product will more accurately reflect the expected costs imposed by the
manufacture of that good. Consumers will pay higher prices for goods created
using potentially hazardous, untested, and unregulated chemicals, creating
competitive pressure to use chemicals governed by OSHA exposure limits. This
is a significant improvement over the status quo, where much of the expected
cost of using a risky or untested chemical is externalized to the general public
and taxpayers through burdens on workers, their families, social security
programs, and the general health insurance industry.
B. Implementation. A New National Commission on State Workers'
Compensation Laws and Recommended State Statutory Amendments
My proposed reforms could be accomplished by amending state workers'
compensation laws to provide for a default burden-shifting framework and to
include in the liability apportionment scheme the suppliers of chemicals used in
the workplace. These changes could be recommended by a new National
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Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws (NCSWC). In 1970,
Congress created a NCSWC to comprehensively review the adequacy of state
workers' compensation laws. 298 The prior NCSWC found state workers'
compensation laws were, at the time, "neither adequate nor equitable." 299 The
NCSWC made nineteen "essential" recommendations for reforming state
workers' compensation laws. 300 The NCSWC warned that federal workers'
compensation legislation might be required in the absence of prompt reform of
the deficiencies at the state level. 30 1 The states implemented, at least to some
degree, most of the recommendations of the NCSWC, resulting in more
extensive workers' compensation coverage and benefits for injured workers. 30 2
A new NCSWC should be created and specifically instructed to address the
market failures and regulatory shortcomings of state workers' compensation
systems regarding occupational disease. 30 3 As with the 1972 Report, a NCSWC
2 9 8 NAT'L COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMP. LAWS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 3-4 (1972), available at http://
www.workerscompresources.com/National Commission Report/national commission
report.htm.
2 9 9 1d. at 25.
300Id. at 26.
301 Id
3 0 2 See NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., ADEQUACY OF EARNINGS REPLACEMENT IN
WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS: A REPORT OF THE STUDY PANEL ON BENEFIT
ADEQUACY OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION STEERING COMMITTEE 15 (H. Allan Hunt ed.,
2004) ("The states did make a significant effort to comply, and through the decade of the
1970s benefits generally were increased and eligibility was expanded."); see also U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR REPORT, STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS IN EFFECT ON JANUARY 1, 2004
COMPARED WITH THE 19 ESSENTIAL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS (2004), available at http://www.workers
compresources.com/National Commission Report/NationalCommission/1-2004/Jan2004_
nat com.htm. The NCSWC was charged with undertaking "an effective study and
evaluation of State workmen's compensation laws in order to determine if such laws provide
an adequate, prompt, and equitable system of compensation" and to determine whether
federal legislation was necessary to improve such programs. 29 U.S.C. § 676 (2006); see
also NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., supra, at 7.
303 In 2009, a bill was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives to create a new
NCSWC. See National Commission on State Workers' Compensation Laws Act of 2009,
H.R. 635, 111 th Cong. (2009). This bill would direct the new NCSWC to evaluate a number
of items related to workers' compensation benefit and coverage. Id. § 4(b). Although
adequate coverage of workplace injuries and diseases is a general subject for review,
H.R. 635 does not specifically require review of standards for establishing causation in
chemical exposure cases, nor does it specifically direct the consideration of potentially
expanding workers' compensation laws to reach chemical manufacturers. See H.R. 635. The
U.S. Chamber of Commerce opposed this legislation, contending that it would "serve as a
vehicle to undermine state-based workers' compensation systems" and would "drastically
increase costs for every employer." Letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce et al. Opposing
H.R. 635, to the Members of the United States House of Representatives (Apr. 28, 2009),
available at http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2009/multi-industry-letter-opposing-
hr-63 5 -national-commission-state-workers-compensa. H.R. 635 was referred to the House
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recommendation on occupational diseases related to chemical exposures could
be backed by the threat of potential national legislation on occupational
diseases. 304
Below is one concrete example of how states could follow a NCSWC
recommendation to implement this proposal by amending their workers'
compensation laws. Section 47 of the New York Workers' Compensation Law
currently provides that if an employee was employed in a process specifically
listed in the schedule of diseases, and his disease is in the column directly
opposite the description of the process, "the disease presumptively shall be
deemed to have been due to the nature of that employment. ' 30 5 The New York's
Workers' Compensation Law, and specifically Article 3 covering Occupational
Diseases, could be amended, without removing the scheduled presumptions, by
inserting a new subsection (b) to Section 47, adding an additional source of a
presumption as envisioned by my proposal:
§ 47(b). If the employee's disease is alleged to be the result of occupational
exposure to a chemical or substance, other than those specifically listed in
the schedule of processes and diseases found in Section 3, and the employee
presents prima facie evidence that (1) the employee was exposed to the
chemical or substance while in the employer's employment, and (2) the
chemical or substance may cause the disease from which the employee
suffers, then the disease presumptively shall be deemed to have been due to
the nature of that employment. For purposes of this subsection, a prima
facie showing that a chemical or substance may cause the disease from
which the employee suffers may be established by evidence from one or
more animal, epidemiological, or pharmacokinetic study conducted in
accordance with established scientific principles, or by expert testimony
grounded in the methods and procedures of science, relating to structural
similarities of the chemical or substance to other chemicals or substances
for which animal, epidemiological, or pharmacokinetic studies are
available.
The presumption described in this subsection (b) shall not be available
with respect to any chemical or substance for which there exists a Federal
Committee on Education and Labor on January 22, 2009, but no further action was taken.
See Bill Summary & Status: H.R. 365, Library of Congress, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.
gov/bss/101search.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2012) (Search Bill Summary & Status for the
111 th Congress, H.R. 635).
304The 1972 NCSWC recommendations were similarly backed by threat of federal
workers' compensation legislation. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., supra note 302, at 15.
The adoption of state workers' compensation statutes began before the U.S. Supreme Court
had reinterpreted the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution to permit broad federal
regulation of private sector employees. See id. at 7. A threat of national legislation on
occupational disease would be warranted in light of studies suggesting that the vast majority
of costs from occupational disease are not compensated by existing state workers'
compensation laws. See Leigh & Robbins, supra note 21, at 709.
305 N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 47 (McKinney 2005); see also infra Appendix.
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Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) permanent
Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL) standard. Except for the scheduled
processes and diseases governed by Section 47(a) of this Chapter, where a
Federal OSHA PEL standard exists the employee shall not be entitled to
compensation under Article 3 of this Chapter unless the employee
establishes either: (a) by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employee
was exposed to the chemical or substance at levels exceeding the OSHA
PEL; or (2) by clear and convincing evidence, that the employee's disease
was caused by exposure to the chemical or substance, even though the
employee was exposed at or below the PEL.
In order to include chemical manufacturers and suppliers in the ex post
compensation scheme, Article 3 of New York's Workers' Compensation Law
could be further amended to permit employers to include chemical
manufacturers and suppliers as part of the apportionment scheme. Section 44 of
the Workers' Compensation Law currently provides that the "total
compensation due shall be recoverable from the employer who last employed
the employee in the employment to the nature of which the disease was due and
in which it was contracted," but further provides that such employer may seek
"apportionment of such compensation among the several employers who since
the contraction of such disease shall have employed such employee in the
employment to the nature of which the disease was due." 30 6 This section could
be amended to provide that employers may include in apportionment
proceedings any chemical manufacturers or suppliers (which should be defined
in the definitions section of the statute) that manufactured the chemical at issue
or distributed the chemical at issue to the employer(s). The full amount of
compensation due could be apportioned to any such chemical manufacturers or
suppliers if the employer(s) can establish at a hearing that the entities supplied
any amount of the chemical or substance at issue. Such entities could avoid
apportionment if they can demonstrate at a hearing that the employer(s), in
using the chemical or substance, failed to comply with the precautionary
information provided by the manufacturer or supplier on the MSDS.
The statutory amendments required to implement my proposal will vary
from state to state, and the details of particular proposals should be left to the
state legislatures. The goal of the legislative amendments, however, should be
effectively to implement the two key features of my proposed reform: a default
burden allocation framework on the element of causation and the inclusion of
chemical manufacturers and suppliers in the ex post compensation
arrangements.
306 N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW § 44 (McKinney 2005).
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C. Remaining Challenges
1. Solving the Trade Secret Problem
The assertion of trade secret protection is a potential threat to the efficacy of
any worker disease regulatory system, including the one proposed herein. 30 7 By
claiming that the diacetyl substitute compounds are trade secrets, food-flavoring
manufacturers have prevented OSHA and NIOSH from effectively evaluating
the chemicals to which microwave popcorn employees may be currently
exposed. 30 8 Any proposed regulatory solution must consider the difficulties
raised by such intellectual property right claims.
Under the status quo regime, there is significant upside and little cost to the
manufacturer in asserting a trade secret. Regardless of whether the claim is
legitimate or whether the manufacturer actually has competitive concerns, an
assertion of trade secret protection can be a roadblock to regulation, prevent the
development of toxicity information that might suggest health hazards, and
prevent workers from receiving both ex ante and ex post compensation for
exposures to the substance.
A default burden allocation scheme, by contrast, may achieve a more
efficient level of trade secret protection by placing the costs and benefits of
revealing the information completely in the hands of the purported trade secret
owners-those in the best position and with the best information to make such
determinations. To illustrate, assume that a manufacturer is producing an
artificial butter flavor using a diacetyl substitute, and that the manufacturer is
considering whether to assert a trade secret protection over the proprietary
chemical structure of the substitute. If the competitive value of the purported
trade secret to the manufacturer is very high, and (knowing the chemical
structure of the substitute) the manufacturer reasonably anticipates that
exposures to the substitute are safe, even at high levels, then it will not produce
detailed information about the chemical composition of the substitute in order to
convince OSHA to enact a permanent PEL. Instead, it will keep information
about the chemical composition confidential, expecting no or few claims of
illness or disease from exposure to the substitute. If forced to defend a
compensation claim under the default burden-shifting framework, it will do so
by developing and presenting any available evidence on the toxicity or chemical
structure of the substitute, and may be able to file such evidence under seal in
order to preserve the competitive value of its formula.
If, however, the competitive value of the purported trade secret to the
manufacturer is actually low (under the status quo, it might use the trade secret
30 7 See Lin, supra note 1, at 962 ("In addition, [government agencies and consumer
organizations] may not be able to access the information needed to conduct safety testing
because of trade secret claims by manufacturers."); McGarity & Shapiro, supra note 257, at
38 n.233; Wagner, Commons Ignorance, supra note 17, at 1699 1705.
30 8 See supra notes 103 08 and accompanying text.
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claim primarily to avoid regulation rather than for competitive reasons) and the
manufacturer reasonably believes that exposure to the substitute at high levels
may be risky, but at low levels should be safe, then it will have an incentive
under the default burden allocation scheme to develop and turn over toxicity
information establishing that dose-response relationship. The secrecy of the
chemical composition of the substitute will hold little value to the manufacturer,
and not developing or divulging toxicity information will do the manufacturer
no good because the burden of disproving causation will remain on the
manufacturer unless it can convince OSHA to adopt a PEL for the compound.
In this way, the default burden allocation system forces chemical
manufacturers to internalize and carefully weigh the costs and benefits of
asserting trade secret protection over their newly developed chemical
compounds. In contrast to the status quo, the default burden allocation system
may encourage the divulgence or preservation of purported trade secrets at
socially optimal levels.
2. Biased Science
A default burden allocation regime that includes chemical manufacturers in
the ex post compensation system is more likely to generate new scientific
information than the status quo and at least some of the recent regulatory
proposals. One acknowledged limitation of this proposal, however, is that the
source of the new science will be interested parties. As Professors Wagner and
McGarity explain in Bending Science, interested parties have a strong economic
incentive and multiple opportunities in the process of developing science to
influence or, to borrow their term, "bend" the science in order to arrive at a
desired outcome. 30 9 One potential criticism of my proposal is that it may lead to
more science, but it will just be more flawed science, brought to you by profit-
motivated chemical manufacturers and self-interested employers.
This incentive, I posit, is inherent in the chemical exposure problem and can
only be mitigated rather than eliminated. Chemical manufacturers, and, to a
lesser, extent employers in industries using chemicals in their manufacturing
process, are the entities in the best position to generate new science. OSHA
does not have sufficient resources to develop significant amounts of new
science on thousands of untested chemicals. The best it can do is to prioritize, in
triage fashion, the deployment of its resources to studying and evaluating
chemicals that are produced in high volumes or otherwise appear potentially
risky based on their chemical structures and similarities to other compounds.
Absent a funded super study, along the lines of Professor Lyndon's proposal,
truly independent studies of thousands of chemicals appear to be out of reach.
Government agencies, employees, unions, and worker advocate groups do not
30 9 MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 68, at 3-5; see also MICHAELS, supra note 51, at
47 ("Follow the science wherever it leads? Not quite. This is science for hire, period, and it
is extremely lucrative.").
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have sufficient resources to engage in such an extensive research undertaking.
So we must rely on the least-cost information generators to pay for studies, and
create the best possible circumstances for independent experts or worker groups
to uncover any flaws in the science generated by the chemical industry.
This does not mean that a default burden allocation regime is doomed to fail
under an avalanche of biased science. Reforms such as requiring disclosures of
conflicts of interests for researchers, requiring the production of underlying
data, requiring the production of studies reaching negative results, improving
peer review, and improving regulatory analysis and oversight can mitigate the
problems caused by incentives to bend science. 3 10 My proposal can enhance
these reform efforts. Under my proposal, OSHA will be able to redeploy some
of its limited resources away from tasks like developing scientific information,
coaxing employers into voluntary compliance arrangements, monitoring
compliance with the Hazard Communication Standard, and defending its
proposed standards against judicial attack and focus its resources more on the
evaluation of newly available (but potentially bent) scientific data. Additionally,
the public submission by industry of new toxicity studies to OSHA and NIOSH
will allow advocates for worker safety and organized labor access to underlying
data in order to scrutinize the results and challenge any industry-proposed
OSHA PELs that are based on flawed science. While my proposed default
burden-shifting system cannot solve the problem of biased science, it can help
to mitigate it by improving the oversight and critical review of newly-generated
science.
VII. CONCLUSION
The free market and the current regulatory approaches to worker safety are
failing to achieve efficient levels of risk and precaution and are also failing to
adequately compensate workers for the expected costs of exposure to hazardous
chemicals in the workplace. Exploring new, more creative regulatory
approaches is justified and warranted.
In this paper, I have presented a novel regulatory proposal that takes
advantage of the existing state workers' compensation systems and OSHA's
existing regulatory framework. The proposal attempts to address the market
failures caused by inadequate access to information and negative externalities
imposed on third parties by employers and chemical manufacturers. The two
key features of my proposal are: (1) a default burden allocation on the issue of
causation that applies only in the absence of a permanent OSHA PEL standard,
and (2) the inclusion of chemical manufacturers and suppliers in the workers'
compensation system. Implementation of my proposal could be accomplished
3 10 McGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 68, at 260-61 (describing ways in which
government agencies can counteract advocates' attempts to bend science by recruiting
respected, independent scientists to review submissions, penalizing abuses, and encouraging
advocates with diverse interests to scrutinize submissions).
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by amendments to current state workers' compensation laws and could be
coordinated by a new National Commission on State Workers' Compensation
Laws.
Unlike other recent suggested reforms to worker disease laws, my proposal
would both close the toxicity information gap and provide adequate
compensation to workers for the expected costs of exposure to hazardous
substances and chemicals. While opportunities will remain for chemical
manufacturers and industry to influence the new science they produce, my
proposal will permit OSHA regulators to direct their efforts to the evaluation of
new science, rather than many of the less productive efforts they engage in
under the status quo regime. By harnessing the financial incentives of the least-
cost information providers, this proposal promises to solve the persistent
problem of occupational disease caused by chemical exposures.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: New York Workers' Compensation Law
Section 3.2 Schedule of Occupational Diseases. Compensation shall be
payable for disabilities sustained or death incurred by an employee
resulting from the following occupational diseases:
COLUMN ONE
DESCRIPTION OF DISEASES
1. Anthrax.
2. Lead poisoning or its
sequelae.
3. Zinc poisoning or its
sequelae.
4. Mercury poisoning or its
sequelae.
5. Phosphorus poisoning or its
sequelae.
6. Arsenic poisoning or its
sequelae.
7. Poisoning by wood alcohol.
COLUMN TWO
DESCRIPTION OF PROCESS
1. Handling of wool, hair,
bristles, hides or skins.
2. Any process involving the
use of or direct contact
with lead or its
preparations or
compounds.
3. Any process involving the
use of or direct contact
with zinc or its
preparations or compounds
or alloys.
4. Any process involving the
use of or direct contact
with mercury or its
preparations or
compounds.
5. Any process involving the
use of or direct contact
with phosphorous or its
preparations or
compounds.
6. Any process involving the
use of or direct contact
with arsenic or its
preparations or
compounds.
7. Any process involving the
use of wood alcohol or any
preparation containing
wood alcohol.
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[Continued from previous page]
COLUMN ONE
DESCRIPTION OF DISEASES
8. Poisoning by benzol or
nitro-, hydro-, hydroxy-,
and amido-derivatives of
benzene (dimitrobenzol,
anilin, and others), or its
sequelae.
9. Poisoning by carbon
bisulphide or its sequelae,
or any sulphide.
10. Poisoning by nitrous fumes
or its sequelae.
11. Poisoning by nickel carbonyl
or its sequelae.
12. Dope poisoning (poisoning
by tetrachlor-methane or
any substance used as or in
conjunction with a solvent
for acetate of cellulose or
nitro cellulose, or its
sequelae[)].
13. Poisoning by formaldehyde
and its preparations.
14. Chrome ulceration or its
sequelae or chrome
poisoning.
COLUMN TWO
DESCRIPTION OF PROCESS
8. Any process involving the use
of or direct contact with
benzol or nitro-, hydro-,
hydroxyl-, or amido-
derivatives of benzene or its
preparations or compounds.
9. Any process involving the use
of or direct contact with
carbon bisulphide or its
preparations or compounds,
or any sulphide.
10. Any process in which nitrous
fumes are evolved.
11. Any process in which nickel
carbonyl is evolved.
12. Any process involving the use
of or direct contact with any
substance used as or in
conjunction with a solvent
for acetate of cellulose or
nitro cellulose.
13. Any process involving the use
of or direct contact with
formaldehyde and its
preparations.
14. Any process involving the use
of or direct contact with
chromic acid or bychromate
of ammonium, potassium or
sodium[,] or their
preparations.
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[Continued from previous page]
COLUMN ONE
DESCRIPTION OF DISEASES
15. Epitheliomatous cancer or
ulceration of the skin or
of the corneal surface of
the eye, due to tar, pitch,
bitumen, mineral oil, or
paraffin, or any
compound, product or
residue of any of these
substances.
16. Glanders.
17. Compressed air illness or its
sequelae.
18. Miners' diseases, including
only cellulitis, bursitis,
ankylostomiasis,
tenosynovitis and
nystagmus.
19. Cataract in glassworkers.
20. Radium poisoning or
disability due to radio-
active properties of
substances or to
Roentgen rays (X-rays)
or exposure to ionizing
radiation.
21. Methyl chloride poisoning.
COLUMN TWO
DESCRIPTION OF PROCESS
15. Handling or use of tar,
pitch, bitumen, mineral
oil, or paraffin or any
compound, product or
residue of any of these
substances.
16. Care or handling of any
equine animal or the
carcass of any such
animal.
17. Any process carried on in
compressed air.
18. Any process involving
mining.
19. Processes in the
manufacture of glass
involving exposure to the
glare of molten glass.
20. Any process involving the
use of or direct contact
with radium or radio-
active substance or the
use of or direct exposure
to Roentgen rays (X-rays)
or ionizing radiation.
21. Any process involving the
use of or direct contact
with methyl chloride or
its preparations or
compounds.
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[Continued from previous page]
COLUMN ONE
DESCRIPTION OF DISEASES
22. Carbon monoxide
poisoning.
23. Poisoning by sulphuric,
hydrochloric, or hydro-
fluoric acid.
24. Respiratory, gastro-
intestinal, or
physiological nerve and
eye disorders due to
contact with petroleum
products and their fumes.
25. Disability arising from
blisters or abrasions.
26. Disability arising from
bursitis or synovitis.
27. Dermatitis (venenata).
28. Byssinosis.
COLUMN TWO
DESCRIPTION OF PROCESS
22. Any process involving
direct exposure to carbon
monoxide in buildings,
sheds or enclosed places.
23. Any process involving the
use of or direct contact
with sulphuric,
hydrochloric or
hydrofluoric acids or their
fumes.
24. Any process involving the
use of or direct contact
with petroleum or
petroleum products and
their fumes.
25. Any process involving
continuous friction,
rubbing or vibration
causing blisters or
abrasions.
26. Any process involving
continuous rubbing,
pressure or vibration of
the parts affected.
27. Any process involving the
use of or direct contact
with acids, alkalies,
acids, or oil, or with
brick, cement, lime,
concrete or mortar
capable of causing
dermatitis (venenata).
28. Any process involving
exposure to raw cotton.
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[Continued from previous page]
COLUMN ONE
DESCRIPTION OF DISEASES
29. Silicosis or other dust
diseases.
30. Any and all occupational
diseases.
COLUMN TWO
DESCRIPTION OF PROCESS
29. Any process involving
exposure to silica or
other harmful dust.
30. Any and all employments
enumerated in
subdivision one of
section three of this
chapter.
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